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INTRODUCTION

Although the tools of empirical legal analysis have become increasingly
sophisticated, much of this development has been asymmetrical. Empiricists
have developed numerous ways of assessing the inputs of legal processesespecially in relation to judicial ideology-however, until very recently, there
have been no comparably sophisticated measures of the outputs of legal processes-case outcomes. Without good measures of case outcomes-the relative
placement of the substantive determination by the Court in each case-it is
impossible to empirically answer questions such as whether the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in a particular area has become more conservative over time.
In a recent theoretical paper, Tonja Jacobi demonstrates how the same
sophisticated measures of judicial ideology that scholars use as inputs in
empirical legal studies can be utilized to calculate sophisticated measures of
case outcomes. 1 Jacobi actually develops three different measures, each corresponding to a different theory of judicial decision-making. This Article extends
Jacobi's earlier theoretical work by empirically testing the competing measures
of case outcomes. We refer to these competing measures collectively as the
"Jacobi measures," for lack of a better term. This empirical analysis enables us
to directly assess the plausibility of the Jacobi measures and their underlying
behavioral assumptions-a vital question for empiricists and non-empiricists
alike.
Comparing cases, delving into their details, making fine-grained comparisons, and sifting for nuances of consistency and inconsistency is the heart of
legal doctrinal analysis. Scholars establish the breadth and scope of rules and
standards alike by distinguishing or reconciling competing understandings of
individual cases. Imagine, then, if we had a valid and reliable mechanism of
scoring case outcomes and comparing cases via a consistent, objective standard.
Such scores would not replace doctrinal analysis, but they certainly would aid

1. Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formationand Case Outcome Determination, 2 J. LEcAL ANALysts 411, 413 (2009) ("Currently, empirically-minded scholars have a simple
measure of case outcomes and a sophisticated measure of judicial ideology available for their research.
It is possible to combine these two elements to create a potentially more sophisticated measure of case

outcomes.").
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and complement the more detailed case-by-case analysis in which law scholars
have traditionally engaged.2
In contrast to doctrinal analysis, empirical legal analysis typically reduces
jurisprudential complexity, sometimes to simple binary outcomes, in order to
aggregate and compare hundreds or thousands of cases in a methodologically
rigorous way. Recent legal scholarship has been marked by increasing empiricism, 3 which has garnered attention from judges, legislators, and the press. 4 A
central part of empirical judicial inquiries has been the legal realist and attitudinalist contribution that shows that in most areas of the law, judicial ideology is a
significant factor in determining case outcomes.5 Much of this analysis has been
skillfully undertaken using fairly blunt instruments; 6 however, in recent years,
the scholarship has been greatly facilitated 7by the development of increasingly
sophisticated measures of judicial ideology.
More dynamic and accurate measures of judicial ideology improve our
understanding of the nature of judicial ideology itself and the capacity of
judicial empiricism to provide more nuanced implications for doctrinal analysis. 8 For example, Martin and Quinn's judicial ideology scores have been used
to examine whether Supreme Court Justices' ideologies change over time, 9 as
well as.to answer long-standing questions that have plagued doctrinalists and
other scholars of the courts, such as whether there was a "switch in time that
saved nine." 10
Despite the varied and often powerful application of these measures of
judicial ideology, one powerful use has until recently been largely ignored: the

2. See infra Part I.
3. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CH. L. Rav. 1(2002) (reviewing the
increasing use of formal empiricism in legal analysis).
4. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges andIdeology: Publicand Academic Debates About
Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 743, 744-45 (2005) (describing increased public notice of
empirical research on judicial decision-making).
5. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., Tm COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown, & Co., Boston 1881)
(arguing that "moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy," and judicial prejudices shape
case outcomes); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAEn, THE SUPnREM COURT AND THE ATnrruDINAL
MODEL REvisITED 312-36 (2002) (applying the attitudinal model to Supreme Court search and seizure
cases, respectively).
6. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
7. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlofor the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYsIs 134 (2002), available at http://
www.mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php; see also Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing
Presidents,Senators, and Justices: InterinstitutionalPreference Estimation, 17 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 477,
477 (2001). For a more detailed explanation of the Martin-Quinn scores, see infra Part II.
8. See Bailey & Chang, supra note 7; Martin & Quinn, supra note 7.
9. They do. See Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and
How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483 (2007) (using the Martin-Quinn scores to determine that
judicial ideologies shift over time).
10. There was, but not at the time generally assumed. See Kevin Quinn & Daniel Ho, Did a Switch
in lTime Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYsis (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 33), available at http:I/
dho.stanford.edu/research/switch.html (using statistical analysis to show that there was a "shift," rather
than a "switch," and at a time different than commonly assumed).
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prospect of translating scores of judicial ideology into measures of case outcomes. In a forthcoming article, Jacobi does just that, translating the MartinQuinn scores of judicial ideology into three competing measures of case
outcomes." The three measures correspond to three different models of judicial
decision-making. More specifically, these models of judicial decision-making
are built on contending assumptions about how judges on a multi-judge court
weigh achieving an outcome that most closely reflects their preferences (however those preferences are constituted: by law, politics, or any other concerns)
against the desire to achieve the largest possible majority coalition. 12 In brief,
the models are as follows:
. The "Ideological model" assumes that judges vote strictly according to the
content of a decision and that the only relevant consideration is how closely a
particular decision matches their own preference for the outcome or "ideal
point."1 3 One of the implications of the Ideological model is that once a
decision has achieved a bare majority, no further negotiations or compromises
are likely. Case coalitions under the Ideological model are 14
minimum winning
coalitions, with all case outcomes at the median of the Court.
The "Collegial model" is in many ways the antithesis of the Ideological
model. Its basic assumption is that although judges care about case outcomes,
they will compromise a great deal to broaden a judicial coalition and persuade
dissenting judges to join the majority. The scope for compromise remains
limited under this model because a change made to lure one judge at one end of
the spectrum may prompt the departure of another at the opposite end. Thus
even under the Collegial model, not every case will be decided unanimously,
but the expected level of judicial agreement is higher than under the Ideological
model. Case coalitions under the Collegial model are maximum winning coalitions, with case outcomes reflecting the preferred position of the "last judge
in"-the most liberal Justice in a conservative majority and the most conserva15
tive Justice in a liberal majority.
The "Strategic model" assumes that judges seek to balance their desire to
align individual case outcomes with their preferences and the competing interest
in maximizing the size of the potential coalition. Specifically, this model
assumes that a judge will act strategically to balance the outcome-coalition size
trade-off by using the credible threat of defection to bring a given decision
closer to her own ideal point. Such negotiations may be explicit, but given
prevailing judicial norms, they are more likely to be implicit. Case outcomes

11. Jacobi, supra note 1, at 434.
12. See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Brian R. Sala & James F. Spriggs, II, Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the
Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RFs. Q. 197, 198-99 (2004) (modeling an attitudinalist view of judges
whereby a judge votes for an outcome that comes closest to his or her ideal outcome).
14. See infra section B.A.
15. See infra section H.A.
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under the Strategic model reflect the average views of the majority coalition. 16
In essence, the three models represent three different answers to the question
of whether, and to what extent, judges will make trade-offs between outcome
optimization and coalition building. If judges simply vote their preferences, the
Ideological model should prevail. If judges compromise in order to maximize
the size of the majority in order to lend greater credence to their rulings, the
Collegial model should prevail. Alternatively, if judges act strategically by
leveraging credible threats of defection in order to bring the majority opinion
closer to their own ideal outcome, the Strategic model should prevail. As Jacobi
demonstrates, these divergent assumptions regarding the trade-off between
outcome optimization and coalition building are susceptible to formal mathematical modeling, and
these models in turn can be operationalized as measures of
17
case outcomes.
This Article provides the first comparative test of Jacobi's measures of case
outcomes. Jacobi shows that different fundamental assumptions about judicial
behavior produce very different measures of case outcomes. 18 However, by
itself, Jacobi's formal models do not actually tell us which of those assumptions
are more realistic. Abstract theories of human behavior can only take us so far
in making that assessment. This Article begins to illuminate the ultimate
question of how judges behave by assessing these three competing case outcome measures against a dataset of over 8000 Supreme Court cases decided
between 1953 and 2006 and against a much smaller set of just over 100
Supreme Court intellectual property ,(IP) cases decided over the same period.
Through this empirical analysis, and by comparing the scores produced by
Jacobi's competing measures to the substantive content of the Court's decisions,
we take an important first step in empirically testing the plausibility of the
different assumptions of judicial behavior that scholars have previously debated
in more abstract terms.
The methodology we employ in this Article is both empirical and doctrinal.
The large-n data of all Supreme Court cases allows us to make statistically
robust assessments, comparing the three Jacobi measures to the traditional
liberal-conservative case outcome variable in the canonical Spaeth's United
States Supreme Court Judicial Database (the "Spaeth Database"). 1 9 The small-n
data of the Supreme Court's IP cases adds considerable depth to our analysis.
Focusing on the Court's IP jurisprudence allows us to take advantage of an

16. See infra section II.A.
17. Jacobi, supra note 1, at 440-47.
18. Id. at 449-52.
19. The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database is a widely used database of Supreme Court opinions
developed by Harold Spaeth. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database
(Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm [hereinafter Spaeth Database];
see also Harold J. Spaeth, The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database 1953-2007
Terms (2008), available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/allcourt-codebook.pdf [hereinafter Spaeth
Codebook].
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alternative measure of case outcomes that does not exist for other areas of the
law, because the outcomes of Supreme Court IP cases can be reliably and
validly measured in terms of whether the Court decides in favor of the IP claim
at issue. 20 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's IP jurisprudence provides a discrete body of case law that is both large enough for some empirical analysis, but
small enough for in-depth comparative doctrinal analysis. Accordingly, by
applying the Jacobi measures to a specific and discrete legal context, we can
assess the empirical scores against a doctrinal analysis of important cases.2 1
Together with Jacobi's earlier theoretical work, this Article marks a significant advance in the search for a rigorous method of developing case outcome
scores for empirical legal analysis. Our empirical and doctrinal analysis indicates that the Strategic and Ideological measures are valid and reliable tools for
measuring case outcomes. Our analysis also shows that the Strategic measure is
a better measure of case outcomes than the Ideological measure, and both are
superior to the Collegial measure. By identifying the best means of measuring
case outcomes, this work will allow scholars to undertake empirical analysis
that tracks effects of various phenomena on movements in court outcomes.
In addition to expanding the tool set for empirical legal analysis, this Article
also advances our understanding of judicial behavior more broadly because the
utility of the measures Jacobi provides is linked to the plausibility of their
underlying behavioral assumptions. In essence, ascertaining which measure best
captures case outcomes suggests what mode of judicial decision-making is most
common in the Supreme Court. Intellectual property scholars may also find that
the insights generated by our empirical project provide a useful supplement to
the extensive body of purely doctrinal analysis that exists in IP literature.2 2
Parts I and II provide the essential theoretical background for our analysis.
Part I extends this preliminary discussion of the development of empirical legal
studies and the need for scores of case outcomes. Part II introduces the Jacobi
measures and shows how each measure reflects a different school of thought on
how judges make their determinations. It then introduces the Martin-Quinn
scores of judicial ideology, which are incorporated into the case outcome scores.
Parts II and IV contain our empirical analysis of the Jacobi measures. Part
III applies the scores to all Supreme Court cases, and separately to all Supreme
Court IP cases, decided between the 1953 and 2006 terms. Part IV contains our
statistical analysis. It provides three different modes of assessing how each of
20. Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual

Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801 (2009). The advantages of using Pro-IP as an
additional point of reference are discussed more fully infra Part IL.
21. See infra Part V.
22. Even those scholars who conduct similar longitudinal studies of the Supreme Court's IP
jurisprudence generally do so impressionistically and anecdotally. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Balancing Act:
Reflections on Justice O'Connor's Intellectual Property Jurisprudence,44 Hous. L. REV. 965 (2007)
(reviewing the EP jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v.
Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FoR.DtAm L. Rav. 1831 (2006)
(surveying the IP jurisprudence of Justice Stevens).
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the scores fare. We compare each of the scores to the traditional dichotomous
categorization of case outcomes as either liberal or conservative. In addition, in
the context of the IP cases, we also compare the competing scores to the Pro-IP
outcome-based categorization.
In Part V, we undertake a detailed doctrinal analysis of the Supreme Court's
most influential IP cases since 1953 and assess which Jacobi measure best
captures each case determination. This extensive doctrinal discussion can be
considered an alternative, or a supplement, to our empirical analysis. The
patterns that emerge from this somewhat subjective analysis are clear enough to
permit some significant general conclusions. We conclude in Part VI with an
assessment of the relative value of each of the Jacobi measures, having found
the Strategic measure superior on all tests. We apply that measure to all
Supreme Court IP cases and provide a discussion of the implications of our
results for judicial scholarship.
I. THE NEED FOR CASE OUTCOME SCORES
As mentioned, both legal scholarship generally and judicial scholarship in
particular have become increasingly influenced by empiricism. 2 3 This has produced intellectual advances not only in the now decades-old question of whether
judicial behavior is ideologically driven,24 but has also contributed to more
fine-tuned understandings of how judicial ideology shapes case outcomes and
judicial doctrine-for example, whether liberal Justices consistently favor free
speech, or whether their preference for free speech is subverted when other
substantive liberal goals, such as non-discrimination, are in conflict with free
speech concerns.2 5
Nevertheless, the last four decades of empirical scholarship have proceeded
without a sophisticated objective measure of case outcomes. Such a measure of
case outcomes would allow scholars to answer questions such as: Are cases that
mention federalism more conservative than those that do not? Has search and
seizure jurisprudence become more liberal or more conservative with the switch
from the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court? Are cases that rely on international law and customs more liberal than otherwise similar cases? Are concurrences that are relied on in subsequent cases typically moderate or extreme? The
possibilities are wide-ranging and significant for legal analysis.
Scholars have attempted to develop subjective measures of case outcomes;
for instance, McGuire and Vanberg undertook qualitative analysis of language

23. See Epstein & King, supra note 3.
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 28, 28-29 (1997) (reviewing the attitudinalist literature).
25. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the FirstAmendment?, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 81,
89-91 (2006) (discussing liberal Justices' willingness to sacrifice free speech rights in order to protect
other liberal goals).
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that tends to show up in liberal versus conservative opinions.2 6 However, such
subjective assessments may not be reliable.2 7 Due to this unreliability, scholars
more commonly rely on objective, but highly simplified means of categorizing
or labeling cases. These categories are typically dichotomous-for example, a
case is either pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant-and thus do not provide as meaningful a form of measurement as a continuous variable would. A continuous
measure-one that permits infinite variation along a scale-would allow cases
to be judged accurately by comparing the score with a substantive, comparative
assessment of similar cases.
The primary form of categorization is fairly basic-particularly when compared to the sophisticated contemporary measures of judicial ideology discussed
below. The standard means for categorizing case outcomes is to use the Spaeth
Database coding, which categorizes cases as "liberal" or "conservative. ' 28
These labels are designated according to whether the case outcome favors a
particular category of party before the Court. For example, if the successful
party before the Court is a person convicted of a crime or is a pro-civil rights
claimant, the outcome is categorized as liberal.2 9 On the other hand, if the
successful party is a large business prevailing over a small business, the
outcome is categorized as conservative. 3 °
Although the liberal-conservative dichotomous categorization is very simple,
it can be quite useful as a variable for broadly differentiating case outcomes.
However, it is entirely inadequate as a measure of case outcomes. 3 1 A measure
of case outcomes can be used as a variable, but it can also provide a means of
understanding cases in a field in reference to one another. In other words, unlike
the traditional liberal-conservative dummy variable, a measure of case out-

26. Kevin McGuire &. George Vanberg, Mapping the Policies of the U.S. Supreme Court: Data,
Opinions, and Constitutional Law 2, 28 (Sept. 1-5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://
www.unc.edu/-kmcguire/papers/McGuire and -Vanberg_2005_APSAPaper.pdf.
27. Also, such subjectivity is not necessary: Jacobi's measures make use of objective information
contained in the Spaeth Database, particularly the size and composition of the majority in every case.
See infra Part I.
28. See Spaeth, Spaeth Codebook, supra note 19, at 53-54 (noting in "Variable 31: direction of
decision" the use of liberal or conservative coding, where 1 is liberal and 0 is conservative).
29. Id. In addition, outcomes favoring children, indigents, American Indians, affirmative action, and
reproductive freedom are also coded as liberal. Id. Pro-union decisions are coded as liberal except in the
context of antitrust cases. Id. In cases pertaining to economic activity, liberal outcomes include
pro-competition, anti-business, pro-indigent, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental

protection, pro-consumer, and pro-economic underdog (as well as pro-small business vis-A-vis large
business). Id.
30. Id. Although much has been written criticizing the coding of the Spaeth Database, see, for
example, Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the EmpiricalAnalysis of the Supreme

Court, 60 HASTGs L.J. 477 (2009), inter-coder reliability checks found only three errors with the
direction of decision variable used here. Spaeth, Spaeth Codebook, supra note 19, at 82 (reliability
check on Variable 31: direction of decision).
31. By way of analogy, all you need to know to decide whether to bring an umbrella is whether it is
going to rain. In contrast, to decide what clothes to wear you need to know more about the temperature

than a single binary indication can convey.
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comes can provide a scale on which cases vary, potentially infinitely so. The
liberal-conservative categorization does not provide enough information for any
differentiation between cases, other than as between two discrete poles, and was
never intended as such a measure.
For example, comparing two recent Supreme Court copyright cases, Eldred v.
Ashcroft32 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,33 in terms
of conservatism versus liberalism is entirely uninformative because both cases
simply score a conservative 0 on a 0/1 binary measure.3 4 Such variables are
called "dummy" variables in statistics parlance with good reason. Similar
problems arise for any dummy variable, including the Pro-IP variable we utilize
in our IP statistical analysis. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, for example, the
Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of patentable subject matter."
This clearly warrants a 1 in terms of the 0/1 Pro-IP variable. But so too does the
more modest expansion of patentable subject matter ushered in by Diamond v.
Diehr a year later, where the Court allowed a computer program with a specific
application to be patented for the first time.3 6 Dummy variables are extremely
useful for classifying cases for the purposes of further analysis, but they cannot
be used as case outcome measures because they cannot identify the extent to
which a ruling favors the IP claimant. Most, if not all, empirical work involves
some reductionism of real-world complexity, but the level of reductionism
involved in classifying all cases as one of two outcome extremes renders such
classifications unfit as measures of case outcomes.
What will a continuous measure allow scholars to analyze that a dichotomous
score will not? If a scholar wants to assess the effect of any action or event to
determine whether it lead to an overall movement of the Court in a particular
area of law, a dichotomous score of case outcomes will not allow this but a
continuous measure will. For instance, Baird and Jacobi wanted to test whether
conservative dissenting justices can undermine a majority that emerges in one
case by signaling that similar future cases should be argued on the basis of
federal-state power, and by doing so move the Court in subsequent cases in a
conservative direction (and, likewise, liberal federalism dissents could move the
Court in a liberal direction).3 7 Previously, such a hypothesis was impossible to
test, but using one of the continuous Jacobi measures, Baird and Jacobi find
exactly this effect.3 8
Our analysis involves three important elements that avoid the limitations of
dichotomous variables. First, we employ Jacobi's case outcomes scores, which

32. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
33. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
34. Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
35. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
36. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
37. Vanessa Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using Federalism To
Transform Coalitionsin the U.S. Supreme Court, 59 DuKE L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
38. Id.
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are continuous. Second, we use Martin-Quinn scores of judicial ideology,
which, among their many other advantages, are also continuous and thus avoid
similar problems arising in relation to dichotomous characterizations of judicial
ideology. And third, to check the accuracy of the Jacobi scores, we use the
Pro-IP case outcome variable described above that, rather than being based on
the "upper-dog/under-dog" measure of party status inherent in the Spaeth
liberal-conservative dichotomy, is based on the doctrinal determination of the
Court in its IP cases: whether the Court finds in favor or against the intellectual
property claim being advanced.3 9
These three elements are described in detail in the following Part. Before
doing so, it is worth pausing to ask: Even if the Jacobi scores are a vast
improvement on the simple liberal-conservative labeling of cases, why do we
need case scores at all? Doctrinal analysis provides a detailed description of
cases and does not require reductionism at all, so why compromise in the form
of any score?
There are at least two answers to this question. The first, implicit in our
discussions so far, is that large-n empirical analysis-the (usually statistical)
analysis of trends and characteristics of a large number of cases in aggregateoffers insights into legal phenomena and judicial behavior that are either hard to
see or impossible to prove systematically at a micro level. Because empirical
analysis is only as good as the measures upon which it relies, developing better
scores of case outcomes is an essential task in the ongoing pursuit of empirical
legal enquiry. Put another way, we need viable measures in order to have valid
analysis.
The second answer is that even when we are not undertaking large-n statistical analysis, when we are conducting doctrinal analysis, we are essentially
comparing and contrasting cases or elements of cases. Every legal scholar,
every law student, and many average people on the street can have an opinion
about a given case and can characterize that case based on anecdotal evidence
and intuition. But how do we assess whether one person's characterization is
better or more accurate than another's? No matter how persuasive or insightful
they might be, case-by-case descriptions are not reliable because they are not
likely to be reproduced by independent replication. 4° Case outcomes scores, on
the other hand, offer that possibility. Put another way, we need viable measures
in order to have reliable analysis. 4 '
The Jacobi scores are an attempt to provide the first valid and reliable
measures of case outcomes. The next Part describes the scores as well as their

39. See Sag et al., supra note 20, at 827-28.
40. See JOHN Sco'Tr & GORDON MARsHALL, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 559-60 (3d ed. 2005)

(defining "reliability").
41. A measure is valid if it effectively captures the effect that is intended to be assessed, whereas a
measure is reliable if it yields results that are consistently accurate and stable. See infra notes 42-44
and accompanying text for an example. For the significance of, and often the trade-off between, validity
and reliability, see Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 83-97.
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key constituent element, Martin-Quinn scores of judicial ideology. The measures used to assess the relative merits of the Jacobi scores are described at the
relevant section of Part IV.
II. THE JACOBI MEASURES
There are many different ways of scoring case outcomes that could be
reliable, but knowing which measure to use depends on how we believe judges
on a multi-judge court decide cases. For instance, one potential measure is to
use the ideological score of the Justice writing the majority opinion. This is
reliable because it is based on an objective measure that is replicable by an
independent assessor.4 2 However, this measure would only be valid if we
believe that the author of the majority opinion holds unparalleled influence over
the majority outcome by virtue of having authorship. Some scholars believe this
to be true,4 3 but others have challenged this assumption, arguing that unless the
majority opinion reflects the views of the coalition, the majority Justices will
not sign on to that opinion. 44 Certainly, there are numerous cases where
endorse a proposed opinion, and often that
majority Justices have refused 4to
5
opinion was changed as a result.

Rather than starting with a proposition as to whose views majority opinions
necessarily reflect, Jacobi examines the assumptions inherent in three common,
competing claims about how judges make decisions: that judges are purely
are collegial, or that judges strategically balance ideolideological, that judges
46
Ogy and collegiality.
A. CONVERTING THEORIES OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR INTO MEASURES OF CASE OUTCOMES

Schools of thought that model judicial behavior, such as law and economics
42. It is reliable assuming that a publicly available, rigorous score of judicial positioning is used. See
infra section I.B.
43. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 23 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 276, 276-77 (2007) (arguing that the "persuasiveness, clarity,
and craftsmanship" of an opinion can give the writer a degree of monopoly power over policy
determination in the case).
44. For a critique of the author-centered view of coalition formation, see THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET
AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 110-25 (2005) (showing that
the median would have to be passive for the author to have full agenda-setting power); Chris W.
Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 51 AM. J. POL. Sci. 890, 891 (2007) (empirically testing the results of Hammond, Bonneau, and
Sheehan); Chad Westerland, Who Owns the Majority Opinion? An Examination of Policy Making on
the Supreme Court 3 (Aug. 29, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://www.allacademic.coml
metalpmla_aparesearch citationlO/6/210/4/pages62042/p62042-1.php (empirically showing that the
median of the majority is a better measure than the author of the majority or the Court median); see also
Thomas H. Hammond, Who Most Influences the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court?:
Evaluating the Median-of-the-Majority-Coalition Hypothesis 2-3 (July 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com//metalp-mla-apa-research-citation/2/7/9/4/9/
p2 7 9 4 9 0 _index.html (summarizing the different views).
45. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGrHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 66-67 (1998).
46. Jacobi, supra note 1, at 415.
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and public choice, typically begin by defining "judicial utility," which judges
are assumed to attempt to maximize.47 Sometimes this results in heated arguments about whether judges "maximize" anything, whether they objectively
apply the law, or what judicial utility can reasonably be assumed to comprise.4 8
There is an extensive debate over whether and to what extent judges care about
the ideological outcome of cases; 49 legal doctrine-either for its own sake, 50 for
its power to control lower courts, 5 ' or some combination of those factors;5 2 or
minimizing their work so that they can maximize their leisure time.5 3 The three
models of judicial behavior that Jacobi provides begin by defining judicial
utility, and yet they are largely agnostic on these questions.54
The primary question driving the Jacobi models is whether judges care only
about individual case outcomes reflecting their preferences, or whether they also
care about coalition size. Yet it is unnecessary to specify why judges care about
case outcomes and what it means for outcomes to "reflect their preferences."
Those preferences may be driven by ideology or by a genuine belief over what
the law objectively requires; behavior will be largely consistent either way. For
example, judges may embrace a "states rights" analysis because they believe it
is objectively required by the Constitution or because that position promotes a
conservative agenda. Either way, given that an individual judge has a view as to
whether states rights should be promoted in a case, she will want that case
outcome to most closely reflect her views on states rights, as applied to the facts
at issue.
Similarly, judges could care about coalition size for various reasons. Some
authors argue that collegiality is an important judicial norm, "a cherished source
of joy in the life of an appellate judge,, 55 that promotes the value of coalition
building. 6 Others expect coalition building to be important but for more

47. See Tonja Jacobi, The Judiciary,in Puuc CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Dan Farber & Anne Joseph
O'Connell eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7-8, on file with author).
48. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing the various theories regarding
judicial behavior).
49. See SEGAL & SPAm,supra note 5, at 1-27.
50. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations To Override: CongressionalReversals
of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 503, 504 (1996) (modeling Supreme Court
"Invitations to Override").
51. Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
326, 326-27 (2007).
52. See EIEEN BRAMAN, LAW, PoLmcs AND PERCEPION: How POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL
REASONING (forthcoming 2009) (arguing that judges internalize legal norms with idealized notions of
decision-making, but also have directional policy goals that influence their legal reasoning processes).
53. Posner, supra note 48, at 1-2.
.54. See generally Jacobi, supra note 1.
55. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 228-29 (1994).

56. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335,
1335 (1998); David M. O'Brien, InstitutionalNorms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering
the Rise of Individual Opinions,in SuPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INsTrrnONALIST APPROACHES
91, 91 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gilman eds., 1999); see also BRAMAN, supra note 52 (arguing
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consequentialist reasons: to strengthen the power of an opinion by promoting
public, legislative, or presidential receptivity to the position embraced in the
opinion, or to promote the legitimacy of the Court, something that is arguably
undermined by small coalitions determining important cases. Chief Justice
Roberts, for example, argues that "[u]nanimous, or nearly unanimous, decisions
are hard[er] to overturn" than close cases, and so unanimous cases "contribute
to the stability of the law and the continuity of the Court; by contrast, closely
divided, 5-4 decisions make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an
impartial institution that transcends partisan politics. '57 The Chief Justice is
correct: Congressional overrides are more likely when a decision involves an
ideologically fragmented Court,5 8 as is subsequent Supreme Court overruling of
precedent. 59
There is some evidence that judges care both about case outcomes and
coalition building. The evidence of judges caring about case outcomes is
extensive-the vast attitudinalist literature proposes that judges decide cases
based on their ideological preferences. 6 ° Whether or not the reader agrees with
this interpretation, what the attitudinalist literature clearly shows is that trends
in case outcomes can be predicted with high levels of accuracy using various
proxies for judicial preferences. 6 1 More recently, there has been some empirical

that legal norms, more generally, influence judicial behavior, encouraging "sincere" legal reasoning and
inhibiting "attitudinal behavior," or, in other words, preventing judges from constructing justifications
for their attitudinally preferred outcomes); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and
the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1993) (arguing that collegiality
differentiates the U.S. Supreme Court from its English roots).
57. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLANIc, January/February 2007, at 104, 105.
58. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101

YALE L.J. 331, 346 (1991) (finding that "[a] majority of overridden decisions involved 4-4, 5-4, or 6-3
division[s] ... and three-fifths of the [overridden] decisions reflected an ideological split").
59. James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court
Precedent,63 J. POL. 1091, 1105 (2001) (finding that "a minimum winning coalition increases the risk
of an overrule by 53.6% and a unanimous coalition decreases it by 46.9%").
60. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United
States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 971, 983, 987 (1996) (showing Supreme Court

Justices decide cases according to their pre-existing "revealed preferences" in 90.8% of cases, and thus
in only 9.2% of cases "did a justice switch to the position established in the landmark precedent";
concluding that stare decisis does not strongly influence Supreme Court Justices). See generally DAvID
W. RoDE & HAROLD J. SPAEMH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 31 (1976) (indicating various policy
goals influencing judges).
61. See generally Epstein & Segal, supra note 25 (showing the effect of ideology in First Amendment cases); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86

AM. POL. ScL REV. 323 (1992) (showing the effect of ideology in death penalty cases); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997)

(showing the effect of ideology on environmental decisions from the D.C. Circuit); Harold J. Spaeth &
Jeffrey A. Segal, The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base: Providing New Insights into the Court,

83 JUDICATuRE 228 (2000) (discussing various uses, applications, and analysis of the Supreme Court in
the context of ideology); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A

PreliminaryInvestigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004) (showing the effect of ideology in nine of twelve
issue areas at the federal appellate court level).
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evidence of the strong effect of consensus voting. 62 But whereas most scholars
would agree that judges care about case outcomes, for one reason or another,
scholars disagree over whether and to what extent judges will trade off achieving an ideal case outcome in favor of gaining a larger coalition.6 3
Jacobi models three possible modes of judicial decision-making based on
three different views of whether and to what extent judges will make this
trade-off. 64 The first position is captured in the "Ideological model," which
posits that judges care only about case outcomes. Although a larger coalition
may be advantageous, under this theory, judges will not be willing to give
ground on crafting a ruling or opinion in order to enlarge a majority coalition
once a minimum of five Justices is achieved. This model reflects both the strong
view of the attitudinalist literature 6 5 and the approach of some formal models of
judicial behavior.66
The second position on the outcome-coalition size trade-off is represented by
the "Collegial model," which reverses the assumption of the Ideological model.
It posits that judges care about case outcomes, but they will be willing to do
whatever is necessary-short of reversing the Court's ruling-to persuade a
marginal Justice to join the majority coalition. This model reflects a strong
version of the view represented above-that collegial norms are extremely
important to judges.
The third view on the outcome-coalition size trade-off is provided in the
"Strategic model." In some ways, the Strategic model provides a compromise
position between the Ideological model and the Collegial model: it proceeds on
the assumption that judges care about both factors, but does not make an
accommodation-willing presumption about judges as staunchly as the Collegial
model. But the Strategic model does not simply take an in-between position.
Instead, it suggests that judges will be strategic in how they make the outcomecoalition size trade-off, in the sense that they will not be myopic in their
concern over outcomes. Judges will consider how the accommodations that they
are willing to make in the present case will affect their long-term reputationswhich they may care about out of sincere concern for judicial legitimacy, or

62. See generally Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Maker Under a Norm of Consensus: A Structural
Analysis of Three-Judge Panels (Jan. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding a
strong effect of consensus voting among judges in asylum and discrimination cases before the U.S.
Courts of Appeals).
63. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 44, at 13-14 ("[N]o matter where the opinion writer's ideal
point is located, the majority opinion will always end up at [the median] .... [I]f the median justice
prefers SQ to a draft majority opinion... this draft opinion cannot possibly gain majority support.").
64. Jacobi, supra note 1, at 418.
65. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAEr- & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORrrY RuLE OR MnoRrrY WiL: ADHERENCE
TO PRECEDENT ON Ta U.S. SuP.mR~
COURT 313-14 (1999) (finding that consensual norms have eroded
since Harlan Fiske Stone became Chief Justice).
66. See, e.g., HAMMoND ET AL., supra note 44, at 79 (assuming that a Justice's "sole objective is to
have the Supreme Court adopt a policy as close as possible to his or her most-preferred policy on each
case"); Hammond, supra note 44.
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more strategically, in terms of maintaining their power for future negotiations. 67
This approach is consistent with the strategic judicial literature, which defines
strategic, or "sophisticated," judicial behavior as judges making forwardlooking decisions that "maximize their payoffs given their beliefs about the
outcomes at subsequent decision nodes. 68 Numerous studies have found substantial theoretical and empirical evidence of some level of strategic behavior by
judges.6 9
Jacobi models the effect of these different theories of judicial behavior, with
Justices choosing to decide a case at some majority position, Mx; retain the
status quo, SQx; or write a concurrence, Cx. 70 The status quo is the outcome
prior to Supreme Court action-the ideological position of the circuit or state
court determination, such as whether a warrantless search is valid when a crime
that served as the basis for the warrant was not committed. The status quo will
remain the outcome if the lower court ruling is upheld without change or if the
Court decides not to answer the question-for example, if certiorari is denied, if
standing is denied, or if certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. 7 1 The
coalition size is determined by how many judges sign on to the majority opinion
at Mx; however, the content of the majority opinion, its ideological position, is
itself determined by what the majority Justices agree the outcome should be. As
such, for each model, there will be a different predicted case outcome, Mx, and
coalition in support of Mx, for every status quo.
In essence, the Ideological model provides that a Justice will join the majority
if she prefers the majority outcome to the status quo. However, the position of
the majority outcome, Mx, is not just a function of the Justice's choices; it also
reflects the underlying status quo and the ideological position of each Justice,

and. it is constrained by the need for at least a five-Justice majority coalition.7 2

67. Detail provided infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
68. Gregory A. Caldiera et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 549, 554 (1999).
69. See, e.g., id. at 550 (arguing that judicial agenda setting is particularly "fertile soil for strategic
manipulation"); Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An
Empirical Assessment, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002) (same); Glendon Schubert, Policy Without
Law: An Extension of the CertiorariGame, 14 STAN. L. REV. 284, 298-309 (1962) (discussing the
various strategies involved in the Supreme Court's certiorari decisions). But see H.W. PERRY, DECIDING
To DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 15 (1994) (finding from interviews
that Supreme Court Justices sometimes behave strategically, but arguing that deciding every case
strategically would be institutionally overwhelming to the judiciary, and so outcome-focused behavior
is the exception rather than the rule); Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices
as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J.
POL. 824, 836 (1995) (arguing that the extent of strategic behavior varies by individual Justice).
70. For a complete formal exposition of these models, see Jacobi, supra note 1.
71. For more on the modeling of status quo positions, see Hammond, supra note 44, at 6-14.
72. This modeling treats the various stages of the opinion writing process-including the assignment
of the case, writing of a draft opinion, responses of other Justices to the draft, and adjustments to other
Justices' responses, as well as potential concurrences and dissents being circulated-as if they occurred
in one stage. However, each stage can be strategically significant in different ways. See FORREST
MALT&MAN Er AL., CRAFiNG LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 6-10 (2000) (describing
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The resulting predictions of the Ideological model resemble a minimum winning coalition model, with all case outcomes at the median of the Court for all
case facts.73 This may seem overly simplistic, but the median of the Court is
often assumed to dominate case outcomes. Ever since the development of
Black's hugely influential median voter theorem,7 4 public choice theory has
emphasized the importance of medians in all vote-aggregation forums. 75 Recognition of the power of the median has entered both academic and public
understandings of the judiciary, and many now assume that the Court median is
always decisive in Supreme Court opinions, to the extent that some scholars
consider that unless the president can "move the median," he will not be able to
influence the Cpurt through nominations.7 6
The Collegial model proposes a different constraint on judicial decisionmaking: judges will seek a majority opinion, Mx, that will garner the maximum
possible majority coalition among those Justices who prefer some change to the
status quo. This does not mean that every case will be decided unanimously,
because some Justices will prefer a change in diametrically opposite directions
to one another, and thus any movement from the status quo will be a zero-sum
game. But we do expect that majority coalition size will be considerably higher
under the Collegial model. The resulting predictions of the Collegial model
resemble a maximum winning coalition, with all case outcomes at the preferred
position of the Justice who is the most liberal in a conservative majority and the
most conservative Justice in a liberal majority. That is, the "last Justice in" to a
majority, or the "marginal Justice," will dominate case outcomes because that
Justice is the most likely to leave the coalition if her preferences are not
accommodated. So if the theory of judicial norms of collegiality is correct,
every case should reflect the most extreme Justices within the coalition, that is,
the Justice whose preferences are closest to the dissenting Justices.

the various stages and strategy of opinion writing); cf. EPsTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 45, at 59 & n.b
(discussing the strategy utilized in deciding to grant or deny certiorari). For an analysis of the effect of
an open and closed rule for coalition formation within the context of opinion assignment, conference
vote, and certiorari under the ideological model, see HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 44, at 139-228.
73. Jacobi, supra note 1, at 441. When the full Court is not hearing the case, it will not be the overall
median of the Court that has leverage, but rather the median of the Court that is sitting in the particular
case-unless the Justices engage in cross-case logrolling, which Justices consistently deny occurs, even
those who will admit to other forms of strategic behavior. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 69, at 198-215
(interviewing Justices who acknowledge various forms of strategic behavior, such as aggressive grants,
defensive denials, and signaling for desired cases, but strenuously deny logrolling behavior).
74. Duncan Black, On the Rationaleof Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948).
75. Cf. ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMocRAcY (1957) (developing the political
science model of the median voter and electoral behavior in the American political system, wherein
both voters and political parties trend toward centrist positions); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median
Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1275, 1277 (2005) (emphasizing social
scientists' focus on the median Justice as the crucial figure in determining case outcomes).
76. See, e.g., Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51 AM. J.
POL. Scm. 231, 238 (2007). But see Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 98
(2008) (arguing that not all medians are as influential as others and that presidents can influence the
Court by diluting or strengthening the power of the existing median).
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The Strategic model is a game-theoretic approach. It assumes that when a
Justice is indifferent between joining the majority and supporting.the status quo,
that Justice can credibly threaten to switch sides and potentially form an
alternative majority coalition with the previously dissenting Justices. 7 7 The
impact of this threat will shape the placement of Mx.If the threat is credible, the
current majority will accommodate the marginal Justice so as to maintain the
majority. But the threat is only credible if the current dissenting Justices are
willing to support an alternative majority that may still be very far from their
preferences. 7 8 They will only do so if the difference between the proposed
opinion and the alternative majority is greater than the difference between their
preferences and what they would have to endorse to make the median's threat
credible. That is, they will not go on record as supporting a view far from their
preferences unless the new majority is significantly better than the initial
majority. Scholars have provided both detailed case examples and statistical
analysis of the effectiveness of this threat. 79 The resulting predictions of the
Strategic model are that all case outcomes will reflect the average views of the
majority coalition because the majority position is determined by negotiation
within the coalition. So if the strategic theory of judicial behavior is correct,
every case outcome should reflect a compromise between the majority Justices,
as represented by the mean of their ideology scores.
Jacobi considered that the median of the majority could be an alternative to
the mean of the majority coalition for the Strategic measure. Whether the
median or the mean of the majority coalition will be a better proxy for the
Strategic model will depend on whether Court decisions will consist more often
of a majority clustered at the center of the Court or of a majority located at the

77. Cf. Saul Brenner et al.,
The Defection of the Marginal Justice on the Warren Court, 42 W. POL.
423 (1989) ("Marginal justices ideologically closer to one of the dissenters than to any one of
the other members.., defect disproportionately more often.").
78. Canon 19 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that "a court of last resort should use effort and
self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion." CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 19
(1924), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/1924_canons.pdf. So a group of very liberal Justices
should not say that they are willing to form an opinion very far from their preferences simply to provide
the median Justice with a threat against the conservatives in order to move the case outcome in a
slightly liberal direction, unless they genuinely intend to form an alternative majority.
79. Epstein and Knight give examples of Justices amending their draft opinions so as to maintain a
coalition-sometimes with explicit statements such as: "As I need you for a Court ... I send the draft
to you before circulating it." EPSTEIN & KNiGr, supra note 45, at 66. Epstein and Knight also found
that significant changes occur in draft opinions in over 50% of opinions studied. Id. at 99 tbl. 3-6.
Similarly, significant amendments to opinions by dissenting Justices may render an opinion closer to
the preferences of the marginal Justice than the original majority opinion, and thus induce a switch. For
example, Paul Goldstein describes the development of the opinion in the landmark fair use case, Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). PAUL GOLDSTEIN, CoPYuHr's
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO TE CELESTIAL JUKE Box 149-58 (rev. ed. 2003). Justice Stevens' dissent
initially
considered all private use beyond the scope of the Copyright Act, but he amended his opinion
to say that fair use protects private copying for the purpose of time shifting-but potentially excluding
library building-and ultimately garnered a majority coalition. Id. at 152, 156.

Q. 409,
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extremes, respectively.8 0 Recognizing that the median of the majority coalition
might be a viable alternative to the mean of the majority coalition, but without
an answer to this empirical question, Jacobi left to later research the question of
which of the two potential proxies for the Strategic model is better. As such, in
this Article we test two versions of the .Strategic measure-the mean of the
majority coalition and the median of the majority coalition-and attempt to
answer that question.8 1
B. INCORPORATING SCORES OF JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY INTO CASE MEASURES

Although the process by which Jacobi developed the case outcome measures
is complex, the three competing mechanisms of scoring cases are quite simple.
Jacobi leveraged scores of judicial ideology into case outcomes scores by
recognizing that majority opinions in cases are a product of the ideological
positions of the Justices on the Court, specifically those composing the majority.
As such, the three measures she proposed are in essence different means of
aggregating the ideological scores of each Justice involved in a case.
The Jacobi measures are each defined in terms of scores of judicial preferences; accordingly, to make the Jacobi measures operational, we need measures
of those judicial preferences. And not just any measure of judicial preferences-to undertake such aggregation requires a method of scoring judicial
preferences that is continuous, not dichotomous. Fortunately, Andrew Martin
and Kevin Quinn have developed such scores. Martin-Quinn scores are not only
continuous, but are also based on a standard scale, and thus they allow for

80. Jacobi, supra note 1, at 445-46.
81. As discussed in Part I, there has been very little scholarship devoted to developing scores of case
outcomes. However, two working papers have discussed the median of the majority coalition as a
measure of case outcomes. The possibility of using the median of the majority coalition as a measure
received passing mention in Segal and Spaeth's re-examination of their classic attitudinalist tome, THE
SuPREME COURT AND THE ArrrrtonuiNAL MODEL. See SEGAL & SPAErH, supra note 5, at 434. Picking up on
the Segal and Spaeth suggestion, Hammond considered the median of the coalition measure but argued
that it was theoretically indefensible. Hammond, supra note 44, at 4-5. But Hammond only considered
a model equivalent to Jacobi's Ideological model, and thus his conclusion is not persuasive. Chad
Westerland empirically evaluated the median of the majority coalition measure in a 2003 working paper
and found that the median of the majority was a viable measure. Westerland, supra note 44, at 29. In
fact, Westerland found that the median of the majority performed better than a measure using the author
of the case opinion or the Court median. Id. Westerland addressed a question closely associated to the
inquiry here: Which Justice on the Court is most likely to shape the majority opinion in the case: the
median of the Court, the opinion writer, or the median of the majority coalition? He tested this by
examining the ideological distances between Justices and asking which distance is most determinative
of an individual Justice's proclivity to join or not join a majority opinion: that between each of the three
possible opinion shapers-the court median, the opinion writer, or the median of the coalition-and
each other Justice. Id. at 3. Westerland found that the only distance measure that "is in the expected
direction and statistically significant" is that between each Justice and the median of the majority
coalition, suggesting that case outcomes are most likely to approximate the position of the median of
the majority coalition, as compared to the other possibilities Westerland tested. Id at 29. Westerland
used different testing techniques, did not test for the last Justice in nor the mean of the majority
coalition, and based his hypotheses on individual power rather than a theory of judicial decisionmaking process; nonetheless, his results are consistent with our own. See id.
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historical comparisons of Justices across time, even between Justices who never
served together.8 2 Due to these advantages, we use Martin-Quinn judicial scores
in our empirical analysis in Part IV.
It is important to understand how these scores measure judicial ideology.
Martin-Quinn scores are derived based on the votes of the Justices, using a
"dynamic item response theory model"-a series of mathematical functions that
estimate the relative probabilities of every possible combination of judicial
preferences that could give rise to the observed case outcomes. In other words,
Martin and Quinn developed a means of computing every possible combination
of preferences of every Justice that served on the Court from 1937 to 2007
(originally 1999). Of those arrays of preferences, they then determined which
combination best predicts the actual data observed: the case votes.
The data that the functions predict are not only every vote in every case in the
given time period, but also voting patterns among the Justices in every term.
Martin and Quinn leverage not only up-down (reverse-affirm) votes in every
case, but also the size and composition of majority and minority coalitions.
They draw inferences from the tendency of every Justice to join the majority or
dissent, including whether they dissent alone or with others. A Justice who
dissents alone in conservative cases is considered more liberal than a colleague
who tends more often to dissent in 7-2 conservative decisions, and so on.
Because Justices tend to stagger their retirements, there are multiple crossovers between Justices' tenures to compare over time. Martin and Quinn are
thus able to compare two Justices who were never on the Court together by
assessing each Justice's tendency to join majorities or dissents with other
Justices that served with both of the Justices being compared. For example,
Justice Alito did not serve with Justice Brennan, but Justice Stevens served with
both, and so Alito and Brennan can be compared by reference to how each
compares to Stevens. This allows Martin and Quinn to place each Justice on a
standardized scale, which is essential for our analysis because the cases we
examine occur over more than half a century.
Importantly, Martin and Quinn do not import any notion of liberal, conservative, or any other subjective characterization into their computations. Thus
although Martin-Quinn scores are often referred to as measures of judicial
ideology, they make no assumption as to what constitutes the content of judicial
preferences. They simply provide the ordering and scores of each Justice,
relative to one another, on whatever scale is operative on the Justices' preferences.
The only major assumption that Martin and Quinn have to make in order to
develop the scores is that Justices can be arrayed on a single dimension of
preferences. Although the capacity of one dimension to fully describe judicial
preferences has not been proven, there is considerable evidence that a single

82. Martin & Quinn, supra note 7. Additionally, these scores are updated annually. See id.
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dimension captures the vast majority of judicial behavior.83 The fact that one
dimension captures most judicial behavior does not imply that legal analysis is
simplistic, only that most judicial considerations are generally quite highly
correlated. For instance, a Justice's view on breadth of congressional power is
likely to be closely correlated to that Justice's view on states rights and on less
directly related issues, such as abortion or the death penalty. Thus we can speak
of a Justice being conservative or liberal, and although occasionally the justices
surprise their audience, the majority of a Justice's decisions are consistent with
these expectations. In fact, Justices' votes have been shown to be highly
84
predictable across a number of issue areas, including the death penalty,
freedom of speech, 85 search and seizure, 86 federalism, 87 and administrative
law.88
Although the method used to derive their scores is quite complex, and
although some may take issue with the notion of one dimension capturing
judicial preferences, 89 the Martin-Quinn scores closely align with press and
popular perceptions of the relative ideological positions of the Justices. Historically, the most extreme Justices on the Court since 1937 were Justice Douglas
in 1974, Who scored -6.33, and then Justice Rehnquist in 1975, who scored
4.31. When Rehnquist became Chief Justice, he became more moderate, with an
83. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme
Court Through MultidimensionalScaling: Analysis of "Natural Courts" 1953-1991, 112 PUa. CHOICE
55, 58 (2002) (noting that the single dimension solution explains much of the Justices' voting
behaviors).
84. See, e.g., George & Epstein, supra note 61, at 333-34.
85. See, e.g., Epstein & Segal, supra note 25, at 109-10 (finding that although generally the more
liberal a Justice, the more likely she or he will favor litigants alleging abridgment of First Amendment
rights, liberal Justices are no more likely than their conservative counterparts to uphold First Amendment claims where other values, such as privacy and equality, are prominently at stake; if anything,
conservatives are more likely than liberals to vote in favor of speech, press, assembly, or association
claims).
86. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAErH, supra note 5, at 312-36.
87. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court FederalismJurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 741 (2000) (finding that
ideology dominates questions of institutional federalism); see also David B. Spence & Paula Murray,
The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal PreemptionJurisprudence:A QuantitativeAnalysis, 87
CAL. L. REv. 1125 (1999) (finding that federal judges decide preemption cases partly based on ideology,
but constrained by the facts and the legal context, and not necessarily monolithically based on party
affiliation). But see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A
PreliminaryEmpiricalAssessment, 14 Stp. CT. ECON. REV.43, 86 (2006) (finding that preemption cases
are multi-dimensional and "are unlikely to yield clear confirmation for either an 'attitudinal' or a 'legal'
model of judicial behavior").
88. See, e.g., Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of
Agency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q. 265, 276 (1987) (finding that Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and Powell
consistently favored conservative administrative determinations, while Justices Brennan and Marshall
favored liberal outcomes).
89. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2320 (1999) ("It is frequently assumed that ...the majority will converge in a
moderate or median position. This is likely when the Justices' ideal points can be lined up nicely in a
single-peaked fashion along a single dimension, for instance from liberal to conservative ....But
sometimes the options under discussion cannot easily be aligned along a single dimension.").
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Figure 1. Martin-Quinn Scores of Judicial Ideology, 2004 and 2006 Terms
average score of 1.48. The most consistently conservative Justice on the Court
has been Justice Thomas, with an average score of 3.92 (as of 2007). The
historical mean of the Court is approximately 0. Figure 1 shows the positions of
the Justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, which accords with typical
popular perceptions of the Court. 90
Most observers of the Court would agree that Stevens is more liberal than
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, who in turn are more liberal than O'Connor and
Kennedy. They would also agree that Rehnquist, Alito, and Roberts are more
conservative than Kennedy, but less conservative than Scalia, who is only less
conservative than Thomas. Not only do the relative positions look about right,
and thus the Martin-Quinn scores pass the "smell test," but the results are
consistent enough that we can refer to negative scores as liberal and positive
scores as conservative, even though Martin and Quinn do not incorporate any
measure of directionality into their scores. Unsurprisingly then, negative/liberal
Martin-Quinn scores correlate with Democrat coding in the traditional "party of
the appointing president" proxy for judicial ideology, and positive/conservative
Martin-Quinn scores accord with Justices having been appointed by a Republican president.
In addition, prior analysis of IP cases using Martin-Quinn scores and the
party of the appointing president proxy, both separately and together, showed
that Martin-Quinn's scores absorb all of the predictive effect of the party of the
appointing President.9 1 Thus the Martin-Quinn scores appear to be more nuanced than traditional scores of judicial ideology in practice-as well as being
sounder in theory-because they are continuous, not dichotomous, are on a
standardized scale, and are based on the actual votes of Justices, rather than

90. In 2004, O'Connor held the position of median Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of 0.08; with
her retirement and the death of Rehnquist, Kennedy has become the median Justice, with a MartinQuinn score of 0.49. Media portraits of Kennedy as the new "swing vote" on the Court fit very well
with Martin and Quinn's analysis. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines
Itself, Many 5 to 4 DecisionsReflect Narrowly Split Court That Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June
25, 2007, at A3; Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle; Court's 5
to 4 Decisions UnderscoreHis Power,WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at Al.

91. Sag et al., supra note 20, at 838.
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proxies or others' views of the Justices' likely preferences. As such the MartinQuinn scores provide a good vehicle both for translating the Jacobi models into
measures of case outcomes and for testing the accuracy of those measures in
capturing Supreme Court case outcomes.92
The Jacobi models become the Jacobi measures by utilizing the MartinQuinn scores in the following way:
1. The Ideological measure is the median of the Court on the Martin-Quinn
scores;
2. The Collegial measure is the majority Justice with the lowest MartinQuinn score when the decision is coded by Spaeth as conservative, and
the Justice with the highest
Martin-Quinn score when the decision is
93
coded by Spaeth as liberal;
3A. The Strategic-Mean measure is the mean of the Martin-Quinn scores of
all majority Justices; and
3B. The Strategic-Median measure is the median of the Martin-Quinn scores
of all majority Justices.
The Jacobi scores can now be applied to the cases. The next Part applies each
of the scores to all Supreme Court cases and to Supreme Court IP cases. Then,
Part IV assesses the accuracy of each of the scores.
III. SCORING THE CASES
In this Part, we apply the three Jacobi measures (with some permutations) to
all Supreme Court cases decided between the 1953 and 2006 terms and all IP
cases decided in the same period. Before doing so, it is worth briefly describing
why we chose these particular applications.
We chose the period 1953-2006 for both principled and practical reasons.
The principled reason is that this period represents what is generally considered
the modem era of the Supreme Court. In the post-World War II period, the
Supreme Court had discontinued its battle over the New Deal and shifted its
focus to the controversies that continue to engage it today, such as constitutional
battles over civil rights, social rights, and states rights, and the diminishment of
the non-delegation doctrine, with its associated judicial acceptance of the
modem administrative state. The mid-1950s also marks the beginning of the
post-World War II boom, which arguably constitutes a distinct economic era,
and thus a different context for Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to eco-

92. However, the incorporation of the Martin-Quinn scores into the Jacobi measures means that the
Jacobi measures and the Martin-Quinn scores cannot be used in the same applications.
93. Other measures of case outcomes than the Spaeth coding can be used, see infra text accompanying note 96. For a more detailed discussion of this element of the measure, and variations upon it, see
infra Part III.
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nomic manners. The practical reason is that much of the data we rely on, in
particular the traditional liberal-conservative coding in the Spaeth Database, is
only available for that period.
Needless to say, we analyze the full universe of Supreme Court cases during
this period in order to be as comprehensive-and thus as generalizable-as
possible. However, this universalism limits the depth of analysis that can be
undertaken. Our "All Cases" data consists of 8915 cases decided by the Court
over more than fifty years. Obviously, we cannot provide a detailed doctrinal
comparison of multiple scores of 8915 cases, However, we can check our
aggregate results against a more detailed account of a specific area of law. In
addition to looking at all cases, therefore, we run the same empirical checks on
all Supreme Court IP cases in the modem era. In addition, we engage in detailed
doctrinal analysis of Supreme Court IP cases in Part V.
We chose IP as our substantive area of focus for a number of reasons. It is a
manageably sized universe of cases-the Supreme Court decided 105 IP cases
over fifty-five years. In addition, prior work has shown that intellectual property
is an area where judicial ideology is highly predictive of case outcomes 94 an
-element that is important given that the Jacobi measures incorporate the MartinQuinn scores of judicial ideology.
Another important reason for using IP cases is that intellectual property is
unlike most areas of the law, for which most case outcomes are analyzed only in
terms of the liberal-conservative dummy variable. The liberal-conservative
variable is based on the theoretically limited notion of categorizing by party
status-the question of who brings and wins litigation determines how the case
is labeled. Although whether the Court finds in favor of or against an indigent
plaintiff or a large corporation may correlate with whether the case broadly
benefits indigents or companies, respectively, this will not always be the case. A
measure that is based on the nature of the doctrinal determination, rather than
the effect on the single party materially affected by the specific court order, will
come closer to capturing more of a case's broader-ranging doctrinal consequences. For IP cases, there already exists a measure of case outcomes that is
based instead on the Court's doctrinal determination in the case: Sag, Jacobi,
and Sytch (SJS) coded each IP case as to whether the Court decided for or
against the intellectual property claimant. 9 5 To provide the most thorough
investigation of the Jacobi scores, we examine them against both the Spaeth
liberal-conservative scores of cases and the SJS intellectual property claimantscores of cases.96
One complication of using the IP claim variable is that it produces an
94. Sag et al., supra note 20.
95. Id. (developing the variable that distinguishes between cases on the basis of deciding for or
against the intellectual property claim). Note that although IP cases often involve two parties who are
both owners of distinct IP rights, the Court is rarely confronted by directly conflicting claims of LP
protection. For a more detailed discussion of the Pro-IP variable, see id.
96. We have also updated the SJS IP coding to take into account recent Supreme Court decisions.
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alternative category of case outcomes that can be used as a base quantification
in the Collegial measure. As a reminder, the Collegial measure is the case
outcome preferred by a maximum winning coalition-the score of each case
will be the "last Justice in" to the majority. That Justice will be the most
extreme Justice within the coalition; but on any coalition, there are two extremes. The Collegial score for a case is the most extreme Justice in the
direction of the status quo. Thus, unlike the other two measures, the Collegial
measure requires a characterization of the direction of the decision. But in IP
cases, we have two variables that capture the direction of the decision: the
liberal-conservative variable and the IP claimant variable. For completeness
sake, we calculate the Collegial measure twice for each IP case, using both
variables. As such, as well as having two variations of the Strategic measure, we
also have two variations of the Collegial measure. Because both the liberalconservative variable and Pro-IP variable are dummy variables, these alternate
forms of the Collegial measure will produce either the same score or the polar
opposite score, depending on whether the Spaeth coding and the Pro-IP coding
correspond: for example, the Spaeth coding and SJS coding would be the same
if a decision is conservative according to Spaeth, and Pro-IP according to SJS.
A. APPLYING THE SCORES TO ALL CASES

We begin our analysis with all Supreme Court cases decided between 1953
and 2006. The composition of those cases is shown in Table 1. We have 8915
cases spread over 13 subject areas, as coded by the Spaeth Database.9 7
Table 2 shows the descriptive data for the Jacobi scores as applied to all
Supreme Court cases in our study.
The first important point to note from Table 2 is that each of the Jacobi
measures of case outcomes has a mean close to zero. The two variations of the
Strategic scores are similar to each other and to the Ideological score. Both have
moderately positive (conservative) mean scores. However, given the standard
deviations, those positive integers are not significantly different from zero
(historical neutrality). While the deviations for both Strategic measures are
larger than for the Ideological measure, they are still only approximately 10% of
the overall historical range of the Court.
The mean of the Collegial measure is negative (liberal), but still also effectively zero. The most striking fact, however, is that the standard deviation of the
Collegial measure is much larger than the deviations of the other measures.
Given that the historical ideological range of the Court has only covered
approximately 10 on the Martin-Quinn scale, a standard deviation of 2.58 is
exceptionally large, almost three times as large as that of any other measure.
Thus the Collegial measure stands in contrast to the Ideological and Strategic
measures in that it suggests there will be enormous variation among cases,

97. Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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Table 1: Composition of All Supreme Court Cases9"
Policy Area

Number of Cases

Criminal Procedure

2414

27.08

Civil Rights

1543

17.31

Economic Activity

1387

15.56

Judicial Power

1275

14.30

First Amendment

760

8.52

Federalism

331

3.71

Due Process

319

3.58

Unions
Federal Taxation

308
261

3.45
2.93

Privacy

110

1.23

Attorneys

104

1.17

Interstate Relations

75

0.84

Miscellaneous

28

0.31

8915

100.00

Total

Percentage

Table 2: Jacobi Measures for All Supreme Court Cases
Measure*

Mean

Ideological
Collegial (Liberal)

*

Standard Deviation

0.35
-0.19

0.49
2.58

Strategic-Mean

0.13

0.87

Strategic-Median

0.33

0.75

8915 observations for each measure.

rather than moderate variation. We return to this theme below.
Given that the Martin-Quinn scores, from which the aggregate measures are
derived, have a historical average approximating zero, the fact that the means of
all three measures are effectively zero is an encouraging sign that the measures
are not skewed. However, we now undertake more detailed analysis to confirm
this impression.
To continue assessing whether the measures include any bias, we look to
whether the distributions are normal, or if in contrast, there is any skewness
(lack of left-right symmetry) or kurtosis (whether the data is peaked or flat,
relative to a normal distribution). None of the distributions are normal accord-

98. Id.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Case Outcome Scores
ing to the standard combined skewness and kurtosis test for normality. This is
not surprising because the large number of observations in our data means that
any deviation from normality will easily reach a level of statistical significance.
However, some of the measures are far more skewed and have higher kurtosis
than others.
Figures 2A to 2D are a set of histograms constructed to illustrate the
distributions of the measures under investigation. The bell-shaped line represents a normal distribution over the same range of data. A visual inspection of
the scores generated by the Ideological measure in Figure 2A indicates that the
distribution is uneven and very skewed.9 9 The distribution for the Collegial
scores in Figure 2B is notably fiat and is somewhat skewed. °° The distribution
of the outcome scores for the Strategic-Median measure in Figure 2C is also
uneven and skewed, but it, at least, resembles the bell-shaped curve of the
normal distribution.10 1 The outcomes generated by the Strategic-Mean10measure
2
in Figure 2D are closer to normal and do not appear to be very skewed.
We have to be careful interpreting these results: having a normal distribution

99. The skewness of the Ideological scores is - 1.06.
100. The skewness of the Collegial scores is -0.33.
101. The skewness of the Strategic-Median scores is -0.59.
102. The skewness of the Strategic-Mean scores is -0.05.
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is advantageous for performing many statistical tests because the more that
these distributions resemble normal distributions, the less idiosyncratic they
appear to be; but a finding of normality for any of our measures is only a factor
in its favor if the underlying data is in fact normal. There could be two reasons
for the first three of our measures illustrated in Figure 2 showing very nonnormal distributions. First, the data itself could be non-normal. This is less
likely in the All Cases dataset than the IP dataset due to the considerably higher
number of cases in the former than the latter. However, because the Supreme
Court has discretion over its docket by its ability to grant certiorari, it is
certainly possible that the underlying distribution of cases is not normal.
Second, the underlying data could be normal, but the measures could yield
non-normal results because they do not accurately capture at least some types of
cases. If the latter is true, then this shows that the Strategic-Mean measure is the
best measure, because it is very close to normal. The former is unlikely to be the
case because the Strategic-Mean measure comes so close to normality. Even
given the selection effects created by certiorari, it is highly unlikely that one
measure would show an almost normal distribution when the underlying facts
are actually very skewed. Put another way, to show an almost normal distribution when the underlying facts were in fact non-normal, the Strategic-Mean
measure would have to have an exact mirror image of the underlying skew. We
think that this is unlikely; thus we consider the normal distribution of the
Strategic-Mean measure to be a strong indicia of its superiority.
Ultimately, whether the results illustrated in Figure 2 provide support for the
Stategic-Mean measure depends on what our expectations are in relation to the
underlying data. Almost the entirety of cases scored by the Ideological measure
exist in the narrow range between - 1 and 1 on the historical 10-point range of
the Martin-Quinn scale, with only a small amount of variation in case outcomes
even when the cases have starkly different facts. In marked contrast, when
scored by the Collegial measure, the cases' outcomes distribute fairly evenly
across the full range of the historical ideological spectrum of the Justices.
Finally, the two Strategic measures score the cases as ranging more moderately,
between -2 and 2, and in the case of the Strategic-Mean measure, the bulk of
cases centered around the historical Court mean, zero. Thus if we expect a very
tightly bunched range of cases that are skewed left, then the Ideological
measure would be most promising. If we expect something closer to a uniform
distribution, this supports the Collegial measure. If we expect a fair degree of
normality but with a left-skew, the Strategic-Median measure may be most
accurate. But if we expect a normal distribution, then the Strategic-Mean
measure provides the best case outcome measure.
Figure 3 below illustrates how the measures compare over time. It plots the
average of each score for each term along the vertical axis *against time
(measured by Supreme Court terms) along the horizontal axis. From this Figure,
it is apparent that the term averages for each of the measures are clustered in a
fairly narrow range, between - 1 and 1. It is also apparent that for the Ideologi-
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Figure 3. Average Jacobi Scores for All Supreme Court Cases by Court
Term

cal and the two Strategic measures, the term averages tend to move together
across time: each of the mean scores of the Ideological and the two Strategic
measures show a large downward trend in the 1960s, during the Warren Court,
when most observers would agree that the Supreme Court became much more
liberal, returning to moderate relative conservatism from the 1970s onwards.
The Collegial measure is the exception. From the late 1970s, throughout the
1980s, and through much of the 1990s, the Collegial measure casts the average
of all the Supreme Court cases as liberal, in stark contrast to the common
perception of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as relatively conservative. This
is an initial indicator that the Collegial measure may be at odds with the
Ideological and Strategic measures, at least when each is aggregated by term,
and is somewhat of a curiosity when contrasted to common understandings of
the Court. We provide a more formal test of this impression in section IV.C.
Before empirically assessing the relative merits of the Jacobi scores, we now
examine whether the trends from the All Cases data exist in the IP Cases data.
B. APPLYING THE SCORES TO IP CASES

The Supreme Court decided 105 IP cases between 1953 and 2006. The
composition of those cases is shown in Table 3. Over half of the cases are patent
cases, although there are a significant number of copyright cases and trademark
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Table 3: Composition of Intellectual Property Cases 1 °3
IP Issue
Patent
Copyright
Trademark & Unfair Competition
Trade Secret
Right of Publicity
Total

Number of Cases
54
24
22
4
1
105

Percent
51.43
22.86
20.95
3.81
0.95
100.00

and unfair competition cases. The number of right of publicity and trade secret
cases is trivial, and thus we cannot draw meaningful conclusions specifically
about those two topics.
Table 4 shows the effect of applying the three Jacobi measures, with their
variations, to IP cases.
The Ideological measure once again has a moderately positive (conservative)
mean score of 0.25. Again, however, the positive integer is not significantly
different from zero (historical neutrality), given the standard deviation of 0.53.
The two variations of the Strategic scores are similar to each other and to the
Ideological score.' 0 4 They each have moderately positive means and have
standard deviations that, while larger than the Ideological score, are still less
than 10% of the overall historical range of the Court. In IP, the two variants of
Table 4: Jacobi Measures for Intellectual Property Cases
Measure*
Ideological
Collegial Measure (Liberal)
Collegial Measure (Pro-IP)
Strategic-Mean
Strategic-Median
* 105 observations for each measure.

Mean
0.25
0.73
1.07
0.10
0.26

Standard Deviation
0.53
2.80
2.74
0.81
0.69

103. Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
104. Given the small sample size, it is not entirely surprising that we are unable to reject the
null-hypothesis that, on average, the scores yielded by the Ideological measure (median of the Court)
and the Strategic-Median measure are the same. This calculation is based on a simple t-test of the
means. A t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically differentiable, assuming a
normal distribution, and is interpreted using standard tests of statistical significance (p < 0.05).
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Figure 4. Jacobi Scores for Supreme Court ILP Cases by Court Term
the Collegial scores have larger positive means and again have extremely large
standard deviations.

Figure 4 illustrates the relationships between the various case outcome scores
over time. Because there are far fewer cases, Figure 4 plots the scores for each
of the primary measures for every case over the relevant time period rather than
105
relying on averages.
There is, understandably, much more variation in Figure 4 than in Figure 3
because Figure 3 shows the term averages for all cases, whereas Figure 4
identifies each IP case. It becomes apparent from Figure 4 why the variance of
the Collegial measure is so high: although there are more unanimous opinions
in IP cases than the average Supreme Court case, the Coll egial measure has case
outcomes ranging over the full historical distribution of the Court, from -6 to
4. The Ideological and Strategic measures are much more closely aligned, with
both measures showing case outcomes as. clustering more closely around the
Martin-Quinn historical mean of zero than the Collegial measure. This indicates
that the Ideological and Strategic measures predict considerably more power
falling to moderate Justices than extremist Justices, reversing the results of the
Collegial measure.
Having applied the Jacobi measures to our two sets of data, the next Part
105. For the individual scores of each IP case, see infra app. tbl. 12.
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assesses the relative value of each of the measures.
IV. ASSESSING THE SCORES EMPIRICALLY

There are two alternative ways of determining which of the three Jacobi
measures of case outcomes is most appropriate to use in empirical analysis.
First, given that the measures are derived from certain assumptions about how
judges decide cases, one could simply make a determination as to which set of
assumptions is most compelling or persuasive and adopt the corresponding
measure. Alternatively, one could compare the outcomes predicted by each of
the scores to the actual output of the Supreme Court's docket and find the
measure that best predicts that output. The second route not only informs us of
which measure is most appropriate, it also allows us to infer which pattern of
judicial decision-making is, in fact, most likely to have been operative, instead
of assuming which theory is correct. This Part adopts the second approach.
We do this in four ways. In section A, we empirically test the relationship
between each Jacobi measure and the traditional liberal-conservative categorization of cases. We do this for All Cases and for IP Cases. In section B, we run
similar tests comparing all IP case outcomes, as categorized by the Pro-IP score,
to each Jacobi measure. In section C, we run tests of the correlations among the
Jacobi measures to ascertain whether there are significant differences between
each. Finally, in Part V, we assess each Jacobi measure against doctrinal
analysis of important IP cases.
Before launching into our empirical analysis, it is helpful to review some of
the basic terms and concepts used. We conduct a number of tests of correlations
in the analysis that follows. A positive correlation indicates that two variables
move systematically in the same direction as one another-for example, height
and weight are positively correlated in the general population-whereas a
negative correlation indicates that as one variable increases, the other decreasesfor example, wealth and infant mortality are negatively correlated.
Because such correlations could be found even where no relationship exists
between the two variables, we test whether all of the correlations we find are
statistically significant-that is, whether we can confidently conclude that the
relationships we uncover are not a product of random chance. We adopt the
standard scientific measure of "statistical significance," which is reached when a
p-value is less than 0.05-this means that there is a less than 5% chance that the
reported results are a random effect. We also indicate when results are "highly
statistically significant," which arises when the p-value is less than 0.01-which
translates to less than a 1% chance of seeing the result if the relationship is
random.
A. COMPARING THE JACOBI MEASURES TO EMPIRICAL SCORES OF LIBERALISM

Our initial comparative assessment of the competing case outcome measures
is based on a comparison to the traditional liberal-conservative dummy variable.
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Table 5: Correlation of Jacobi Scores and Spaeth's Liberal Coding

Measure
Ideological
Strategic-Mean
Strategic-Median
Collegial (Liberal)
Collegial (Pro-IP)
Observations
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01

ALL CASES

IP CASES

Correlation
with Liberal = 1
-0.20**
-0.61"*
-0.52**
0.77**

Correlation
with Liberal = 1
0.02
-0.47"*
-0.32**
0.82**
0.30**
105

8808

As discussed, the animating purpose of this Article is to go beyond the traditional dichotomous approach to scoring case outcomes; nonetheless, we can still
use this variable to make an aggregate assessment of the reliability of the
alternative measures. We make this assessment for all Supreme Court cases in
the relevant period and also specifically for IP cases.
Table 5 shows the correlation between the traditional liberal-conservative
dummy variable and the measures we are attempting to evaluate. 10 6 It is
important to note that each case is scored by Spaeth as positive on the
liberal-conservative coding if the case is liberal, whereas under Martin-Quinn
scores, more liberal Justices receive negative scores and more conservative
Justices receive positive scores. As such, we expect a negative correlation
between each Jacobi measure and the liberal-conservative variable.
Table 5 reveals some striking results. In the All Cases data, the Ideological
measure and the two variations of the Strategic measure are each correlated
with the traditional liberal-conservative dummy variable in the direction predicted. These correlations are significant at the 0.01 level, 10 7 although in the
case of the Ideological measure, the size of the correlation is not particularly
large (-0.20).1° 8 The correlation coefficients for the two variations of the
Strategic measure are considerably more substantial: -0.61 for the StrategicMean measure and -0.52 for the Strategic-Median measure.
The correlation between the Collegial measure and the traditional liberal-

106. Although we run a pair-wise correlation in this analysis, the results are almost exactly the same

using a Spearman correlation. There are only 8808 observations in this table because the Spaeth
liberal-conservative coding was missing in some cases.
107. Again, this effectively means that there is a less than 1% chance that the finding of a

relationship is a product of random chance.
108. In absolute values, the level of correlation ranges from 0 to 1, with I indicating perfect
correlation and 0 indicating no correlation whatsoever. A negative correlation means that the two
variables change together but in the opposite direction.
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conservative dummy variable is also significant at the 0.01 level; however, it is
in the opposite direction to that predicted. Thus by accounting for the most
extreme Justice on the Court in the direction of the status quo, the Collegial
measure appears to reverse the direction of case outcomes from what is expected. In essence, our results show that for the Collegial measure to be
accurate, liberal majorities must be willing to sign on to extreme conservative
outcomes in order to maintain large coalitions, and vice versa. This constitutes a
second strike against the viability of the Collegial measure: it does not accord
with common views of the direction of specific Court eras-the relative conservatism of the Burger and Rehnquist eras-and is at odds with the liberalconservative characterization of case outcomes.
In the All Cases data, each of the correlations between the Jacobi measures
and the liberal-conservative case scores is highly significant at the 0.01 level.
Moreover, the differences between the correlations themselves are also highly
statistically significant in the All Cases data.l 0 9
We see the same overall pattern emerge in the smaller set of IP Cases,
although with some differences. Once again, both variants of the Strategic
measure are in the direction predicted (negative), are substantively significant,
and are highly statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The magnitude of the
correlation coefficients for the Strategic-Mean and the Strategic-Median measures are fairly similar, -0.47 and -0.32, respectively. Given the small sample
size and the fact that the correlation between the two is highly significant, we
cannot say with confidence that there is any difference between those two
correlations.
In contrast to the All Cases data, the Ideological measure does not appear to
have any substantive or statistically significant relationship with the liberalconservative variable in IP Cases. The correlation coefficient is close to zero,
and the p-value of 0.87 does not come close to statistical significance. This
difference from the results in the All Cases data may result from the fact that the
sample size in the IP Cases is considerably smaller, or it may result from some
systematic difference between IP cases and Supreme Court cases generally of
which we are unaware." 0
As discussed, we chose to analyze IP Cases in addition to simply looking at
All Cases in part because it gives us another way of assessing case outcomes,
apart from the traditional liberal-conservative coding. Because we can code
cases based on either Spaeth's assessment of the outcome (as either liberal or

109. The difference between two correlations can be compared with the assistance of Fisher's r-to-z
Transformation, which converts the correlation statistic r into the normally distributed variable z. See
generally James H. Steiger, Tests for Comparing Elements of a CorrelationMatrix, 87 PSYcHOL. BULL.
245 (1980) (reviewing the literature on the comparison of correlation coefficients). For a more detailed
explanation, see REBECCA M. WARNER, APPLIED STATISTCS: FROM BIvARIATE THROUGH MULTVARIATE
TECHNIQUES 275-77 (2007).
110. In light of our previous findings in Ideology and Exceptionalism, we find this second explanation unlikely. See Sag et al., supra note 20, at 846; supra section II.B.
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Table 6: Correlation of Jacobi Scores and SJS Pro-IP Coding in IP Cases
Measure
Ideological
Collegial (Liberal)
Collegial (Pro-IP)
Strategic-Mean
Strategic-Median
Observations: 105
*=

Correlation with Pro-IP = 1
0.13
-0.32**
-0.84**
0.33**
0.27**

p < 0.05;** = p < 0.01

conservative) or our own measure (favoring or disfavoring the IP claimant), we
have two alternative categories of case outcomes that can be used as base
quantifications in the Collegial measure. As reported in Table 5, both variants of
the Collegial measure are substantively and statistically significant, but again in
the wrong direction. The primary Collegial measure has an enormous correlation of 0.82, which means that cases that Spaeth codes as liberal will overwhelmingly result in conservative Collegial case outcome scores. The strength of the
correlation for the alternative Collegial measure is much weaker, 0.30, but
remains significant. Thus, for IP Cases as well as All Cases, the Collegial
measure has results contrary to expectations.
B. COMPARING THE JACOBI MEASURES TO AN EMPIRICAL SCORE OF IP CASE OUTCOMES

In this section, we make use of the SJS case outcome variable, which codes
each IP case according to whether the Court decides in favor of the intellectual
property claimant. In their investigation of the relationship between ideology
and judicial decision-making in IP cases, SJS found that ideology is a significant determinant of cases involving IP rights: the more conservative a Justice is,
the more likely he or she is to vote in favor of an IP claim. I" l In short, SJS
established that attitudes about IP. issues are part of the liberal-conservative
ideological continuum, not an exception to it.112 In light of this finding, we are
able to use the coding scheme devised by SJS to supplement our current
analysis because it offers an alternative indication of whether a case should be
considered liberal or conservative. Accordingly, on the assumption that outcomes that favor the IP claimant are generally conservative, we now expect to
find a positive correlation between each of the Jacobi measures and the Pro-IP
outcome variable. Table 6 illustrates our results.
Table 6 conforms to our results in Table 5 in the previous section. The
correlation between the Pro-IP variable and the Ideological measure is in the

11. Sag et al., supra note 20, at 838.
112. Id.
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direction predicted (positive), but the coefficient is small and not statistically
significant. In statistical terms, it is not distinguishable from zero. The Strategic
measures are again positive, modestly sized (0.33 and 0.27), and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The primary version of the Collegial measureusing the Martin-Quinn score of the majority Justice who is closest to the status
quo-is significant at the 0.01 level, but once again, in the opposite direction to
11 3
that predicted. The coefficient (-0.32) is negative and significant.
This provides yet another indication that the Collegial measure is somewhat
lacking and that the Ideological measure is inferior to the Strategic measures, at
least in the intellectual property context, because it failed to show the predicted
result, both when tested as against the liberal-conservative variable and against
the Pro-IP variable.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE MEASURES FOR ALL CASES AND IP CASES

A pattern has emerged in the correlations between the Jacobi measures and
the traditional liberal-conservative outcome coding and the correlations between
the Jacobi measures and the SJS Pro-IP coding. The Strategic measure, in both
permutations, demonstrated a substantive and significant level of correlation
with the traditional liberal-conservative outcome coding in the All Cases and in
the IP Cases data. The Ideological measure appeared to be only weakly and
inconsistently correlated with either outcome variable, while the Collegial
measure appeared to be quite perverse. The c6rrelations between the measures
and the alternative Pro-IP outcome variable reinforced the inference in favor of
the Strategic measures.
Before we can reach any final conclusions about the relative merits of the
measures, however, three questions must be answered. First, is there any
significant difference among the three Jacobi measures? That is, are the differences we have so far identified trivial or consequential? Second, is the impression that the Collegial measure is effectively unrelated to the overall direction
of the Court correct? That is, are the seemingly perverse results of the Collegial
measure systematic and not just impressionistic? Third, is there any significant
difference between the two permutations of the Strategic measure? That is, if
we conclude that the Strategic measure is the best measure of case outcomes,
which version should we use? If the answer to these three questions is "yes,"
then we can confidently reach a conclusion over which measure of case
outcomes is recommended for use in empirical legal analysis. These three
questions can be answered by examining the relationships among the three
Jacobi measures.
When looking only at term averages, the three measures appear similar

113. For completeness, we performed the same analysis using the second version of the Collegial
measure. However, any result on this variant of the measure has to be treated with suspicion because it
is somewhat circular, in that both sides of the ledger use Pro-IP. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient for this
version of the measure is extremely high, yet it is still in the wrong direction.
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Figure 5. Strategic Scores for All Supreme Court Cases with Ideological
Scores by Court Term
because all coalesce around the historical mean of zero. But when examining
the distribution of the measures in greater detail, it becomes clear that the
measures are in fact quite different from one another. To visualize the relationships between the measures, we have charted the individual case outcome
scores for the Strategic and Collegial measures against the term average for the
Ideological measure in the Figures below. Figure 5 shows the Strategic-Mean
scores for each of the 8915 Supreme Court cases, along with the position of the
term averages of the Ideological measure. Figure 6 undertakes the same analysis
for the Collegial measure, showing every case's Collegial score and, once again,
the term average of the Ideological measure.
A comparison of Figures 5 and 6 indicates that the Strategic-Mean measure
and the Ideological measure are more closely tied to each other than the
Collegial measure is to either.114 However, a simple t-test confirms that although the means for the Ideological score and the Strategic-Mean score are
fairly close, there is a meaningful distance between them.11 5
Whereas in Figure 5 the overwhelming majority of case outcome scores

114. An impression we confirm more formally below in this Part.
115. See supra note 104. A paired t-test here rejects the null-hypothesis that the means are equal
(p = 0.0003).
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Figure 6. Collegial Scores for All Supreme Court Cases with Ideological
Scores by Court Term

under the Strategic-Mean and Ideological measures lie between -2 and 2, the
Collegial scores in Figure 6 range wildly, covering the full historic range of
judicial ideology. Note that Figures 5 and 6 contain the same number of
observations (8915); however, many of the observations in Figure 6 exactly
overlap with one another, which creates the false impression of fewer observations. The broad range of outcomes seen in Figure 6 should only come about if
the Court has faced an enormous variety of status quos, ranging across and
beyond the full range of judicial preferences.
For example, according to the Collegial measure, in the 1960s and 1970s,
there were 195 cases that scored -6 or below. Justice Douglas is the only
Justice ever to have had a Martin-Quinn score below -6. In order to believe the
Collegial measure is a good measure, we would have to believe that the Court
faced 195 sets of case facts that were so liberal that a unanimous Court would
consider an outcome that reflected Justice Douglas's ideal preferences as an
improvement on the status quo.
Similarly, there were 398 cases that scored over 4 on the Martin-Quinn scale.
Only then-Justice Rehnquist (between 1973 and 1980) and Justice Thomas
(between 2004 and 2006) scored over 4 on the Martin-Quinn scale. Yet according to the Collegial measure, a unanimous Court signed on to outcomes
reflecting their extreme preferences in 398 cases in those ten years. Thus for
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Figure 7. Strategic Scores for IP Cases with Ideological Scores by Court
Term

Figure 8 to be an accurate representation of Supreme Court decisions in the last
fifty-five years, and for the Collegial measure to be persuasive, the underlying
facts that the Court faced must have regularly been quite extreme relative to the
Justices on the Court.
Overall, it appears that the Strategic and the Ideological measures are related,
but far from identical, while the Collegial measure appears to be quite unrelated
to either of the other two measures. In IP Cases, many, but not all, of these
effects are recreated. Figures 7 and 8 replicate Figures 5 and 6 with respect to
the IP data.
Figure 7 suggests that there is, again, a high correlation between the Ideological and Strategic measures as applied to IP Cases. As anticipated, the range of
case outcomes under the Strategic-Mean measure is broader than under the
Ideological measure, but the Strategic-Mean measure tracks the median of the
Court fairly closely. The Collegial measure only tracks the median of the Court
to the extent that the scores on the very wide range of case outcomes are
compressed to a range of approximately 2 to -6 in the 1950s and 1960s, when
the Court was more liberal, and then rise to between 4 and -6 from the 1970s
onward, when the Court became somewhat more conservative. Interestingly, the
IP Case outcome scores under the Collegial measure do not appear to represent
the full range of judicial preferences but instead largely track the two extremes
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Figure 8. Collegial Scores for IP Cases with Ideological Scores by Court
Term
and the center of the Court, with few results represented in between. This could
be an idiosyncrasy of IP Cases and does not arise in the All Cases data in Figure 5.
Figures 7 and 8 confirm the impression of Table 4 and Figure 6: the
Strategic-Mean measure tracks the median of the Court reasonably closely,
whereas the Collegial measure does not. The Collegial measure also covers the
full historical ideological range of the Court, even for the smaller IP database.
To confirm these visual impressions, we now check the correlations among
the Jacobi measures. Tables 7 and 8 report the results of this analysis for All
Cases and IP Cases, respectively.
In answer to our first question, whether the difference between the scores is
Table 7: Correlations Among Jacobi Measures in All Cases
SCORE
Collegial
Strategic-Mean
Strategic-Median
Observations: 8808

Ideological
-0.01
0.46**
0.62**

Collegial

Strategic-Mean

-0.04"*
-0.10**

0.86**

* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01
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Table 8: Correlations Among Jacobi Measures in IP Cases
SCORE
Ideological
Collegial (Liberal)
0.21*
Collegial (Pro-IP)
0.07
Strategic-Mean
0.45**
Strategic-Median
0.62**
Observations: 105
* = p < 0.05;** = p < 0.01

Collegial
(Liberal)

Collegial
(Pro-IP)

Strategic-Mean

0.43**
0.02
0.06

0.12
0.07

0.88**

meaningful, we see from Tables 7 and 8 that both Strategic measures are
substantially correlated with the Ideological measure with high levels of statistical significance. In the All Cases data, both manifestations of the Strategic
measure are strongly correlated with the Ideological measure (0.46 and 0.62,
respectively). The results in the IP data are almost exactly the same (0.45 and
0.62, respectively).
But the two measures are not equivalent to one another; t-tests of whether
significant differences exist between the Ideological measure and the StrategicMean measure and between the Ideological measure and the Strategic-Median
measure are both positive, with p less than 0.01. Thus a significant difference
does exist between the two Strategic measures and the Ideological measure.
More specifically, the Strategic measures consistently perform better than the
Ideological measure. As indicated in Table 5, there is a higher correlation
between the Strategic measures and the traditional liberal-conservative dummy
variable in All Cases than for the Ideological measure. Similarly, as seen in
Tables 5 and 6, only the Strategic measures had the expected significant
correlation with the liberal-conservative variable or with the Pro-IP outcome
variable in the IP Cases. Given this, and the fact that there is a significant
difference between the Strategic and the Ideological measures, we conclude that
the Strategic measures more reliably capture the case outcome directions than
1 16
the Ideological measure.
To continue to answer the first question, and to begin to answer the second
question, whether the somewhat perverse results of the Collegial measure are
systematic, note that the results displayed in Tables 7 and 8 continue to indicate
that the Collegial measure stands apart from the Ideological and Strategic

116. These results are in accordance with the only other comparative empirical study of proposed
measures of judicial case outcomes. Mirroring our results, Westerland's working paper finds that once
properly specified, the median of the Court produces results in the direction predicted and at statistically significant levels, but with an inferior fit to the median of the coalition measure. See Westerland,
supra note 44, at 32. Note that Westerland's study did not consider the mean of the majority measure or

the Collegial measure.

HeinOnline -- 98 Geo. L.J. 40 2009-2010

20091

TAKING THE MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY

measures. To begin, there is scant evidence of a correlation between the
Collegial measure and median of the Court. In the All Cases analysis, there is
no apparent correlation whatsoever; in the IP Cases, there is a small (0.21), but
statistically significant (at the 0.05 level), correlation between the main Collegial measure and the median of the Court. In the All Cases data, the Collegial
measure has a small statistically significant correlation with both variants of
Strategic measure (-0.04 and -0.10); however, the effect is so close to zero
that it is not substantively significant. Thus there is no statistically significant
measure and the two
correlation between either permutation of the Collegial
1 17
variations of the Strategic measure in the IP Cases.
Thus in answer to the first question, it follows that the choice between
Collegial and the other measures will always be consequential. Given that the
Collegial measure also bears no statistical or substantial relationship to the
overall direction of the Court or with the other scores of case outcomes--either
the traditional liberal-conservative or the Pro-IP variable-we make a preliminary conclusion here that it is the Collegial measure, and not the other measures
The doctrinal analysis in the following Part
and scores, that is off 1target.
18
confirms this impression.
Combined with our conclusion above that the Strategic measures are meaningfully different from, and superior to, the Ideological measure, our conclusion of
the non-viability of the Collegial measures leads us to conclude that the
Strategic measures are the best mechanism available to measure case outcomes.
This brings us to the third question: Which of the two Strategic measures is
preferable?
The results summarized in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that the two versions of the
Strategic measure are highly correlated, at 0.86 in All Cases and 0.88 in IP
Cases, and both with p-values of 0.00. This means that the two variations are
extremely similar to one another. Nonetheless, there are meaningful differences
between them, and there are numerous reasons to prefer one variant of the
Strategic measure over the other, but they do not point uniformly in one
direction.
One consideration is whether one variant has a higher correlation with the
median of the Court. Neither variant of the Strategic measure perfectly captures
the predictions of the Strategic model-both are close but imperfect proxies.
The relevant imperfection causes a minor skew in each proxy away from the
median of the Court. Thus the version that is more closely correlated with the
Court median will be less skewed from the ideal of judicial behavior that the
Strategic model captures.
As both Tables 7 and 8 indicate, the Strategic-Median measure has a higher

117. For completeness we note that, as expected, there is a substantive and significant correlation
between the two different versions of the Collegial measure in the IP cases. See supra note 113.
118. See infra Part V.
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correlation with the Ideological measure than does the Strategic-Mean. 1 9 Tests
of significance between the two correlations for the Ideological measure with
each Strategic measure confirmed that this difference is statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. In the IP Cases, the difference between these two correlations
is significant at the 0.05 level but only on a one-tailed test. The fact that the
Strategic-Median measure is closer to the Court median suggests that it might
be a less biased proxy. However, given the small difference between the two
versions of the measure, there may be other reasons for preferring the StrategicMean measure.
One countervailing reason to prefer the Strategic-Mean to the StrategicMedian is that the former is easier to calculate in large data sets. Calculating the
median of the majority becomes problematic in any even-sized majority because there is no Justice who is the median of the majority coalition, and the
median would have to be calculated as the midpoint between the two Justices
who sit at the center of the coalition. 120 For sophisticated empirical analysts,
this difference is extremely minor; it may be more significant for less sophisticated users of case outcome measures because the median would have to be
calculated for each case coalition, but we do not consider this factor determinative.
The second countervailing consideration is more significant. As shown in
Part III, the Strategic-Mean measure appears to be much closer to a normal
distribution than the alternative Strategic-Median measure.12 ' Figure 9 provides
a more detailed test of this difference. It illustrates two normal quantile plots
demonstrating how each of the Strategic measures corresponds to a normal
distribution. Figures 9A and 9B plot the quantiles of each variable against the
quantiles of a normal distribution. 2 2 To the extent a plot is non-linear, it departs
from a normal distribution. As is readily apparent, the Strategic-Mean measure
conforms much closer to a normal distribution, especially in the core range
between -2 and 2.
As such, while the Strategic-Median may more exactly capture the theory of
the Strategic model, the Strategic-Mean may more accurately reflect the actual
underlying data by more perfectly mapping how the Justices actually decide
cases.
Both Strategic measures are highly correlated with the two external checks of
case outcomes-the traditional liberal-conservative measure and the Pro-IP
measure. Also, as we show below, both perform well in the doctrinal analysis.
In addition, the two versions of the measure are highly correlated, so the

119. Using Fisher's r-to-z Transformation, we confirmed the statistical significance of this difference.

120. Hammond argues that this is a significant weakness of the median of the majority measure.
Hammond, supra note 44, at 26. However, we think that he overstates the significance of this drawback.
121. See supra section I.A & fig. 2.
122. Quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the cumulative distribution function of a
random variable.
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Figure 9. Distributional Diagnostics for Mean and Median of the Majority
difference between them is minimal. Ultimately, we prefer the Strategic-Mean
measure because it is simpler and more closely resembles a normal distribution,
but we consider that either version constitutes a viable, valid, and reliable
measure for empirical legal analysis.
We now undertake an extensive doctrinal examination of the subset of IP
Cases to check whether our aggregate impression holds up against a detailed
case-by-case analysis of the relative merits of the three measures.
V. ASSESSING THE SCORES DOCTRINALLY
We have some confidence that the empirical investigation we have undertaken so far has proven to be illuminating, and possibly even convincing, for
social scientists and those well versed in empirical methodologies. However,
given that our aim is to convince lawyers and legal academics, as well, we now
adopt an entirely different strategy: a case-by-case doctrinal discussion of the
competing measures. Specifically, we undertake a detailed doctrinal analysis of
ten of the Supreme Court's most influential IP cases decided since 1953.
Naturally, this undertaking involves considerable subjectivity; nonetheless, we
think that the patterns which emerge are sufficiently clear to allow us to make
some significant general conclusions.
Like our statistical findings, in this examination of influential Supreme Court
IP cases, the Collegial scores are often extremely hard to reconcile with a
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Table 9: Scores for Key IP Cases
Case
Diamond v.
Chakrabarty*
Sony v. Universal
City Studiost
Harper & Row v.
Nationt
Community for
Creative
Non-Violence v.
Reid*
Two Pesos v. Taco
Cabanat
Festo v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushikit
Eldred v. Ashcroftt
MGM Studios v.
Grokstert
Medlmmune v.
Genentecht:
KSR International v.
Teleflext#

Court
Pro-IP Liberal Median Collegial

Strategic- StrategicMean
Median

1

0

0.15

0

1

0.73

1

0

0.66

1

1

1.01

1

0

0.56

-2.08

0.63

0.56

1
1

0
0

-0.20
0.22

-2.71
-1.72

0.48
0.56

0.97
0.52

1

0

0.08

-2.54

0.19

0.08

0

1

0.45

2.77

0

1

0.45

4.29

-0.27
1.54
-0.49

2.59

1.10

0.48

0.07

0.73

1.13

1.04

-0.16

-0.12
0.37

1.01

-0.49
0.45

t = Top ten in case citations
= Top ten in law review citations
* Additional case drawn from either the top twenty in case citations or the top twenty
in law review citations
doctrinal understanding of the impact of each case. Also, although the Ideological scores generally provide a plausible characterization of each case, the
Strategic scores typically more closely reflect the substance of the decision. In
short, consistent with our empirical analysis, we find in our doctrinal analysis
that both the Strategic and Ideological scores are plausible, whereas the Collegial scores simply are not. We also find that, on average, the Strategic measures
provide the most reliable scale of case outcomes.
A. CASE SELECTION

We initially selected twenty-two cases with a view to their long-term importance as measured in citation impact in law review articles and subsequent
judicial decisions. We selected these cases based on two objective criteria:
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average rate of citation in federal and state court cases and average rate of
citation in law reviews. We123then narrowed that list to ten illustrative cases for
the purposes of discussion.
Our selected cases are listed in Table 9, which shows the Jacobi score for
each case, as well as the categorization of each case as Pro-IP (where a 1
indicates finding in favor of the IP claimant and a 0 indicates finding against the
IP claimant) and as liberal-conservative (where 1 indicates a liberal outcome on
the Spaeth coding and a 0 indicates a conservative outcome).
We now undertake a detailed analysis of each case, preceded by a table
summation of the related IP area, the division on the Court over its determination, its citation rates, and the various scores applicable to the case. The Justices
hearing the case are listed in order of their Martin-Quinn ideological scores,
with the dissenting Justices italicized.
B. DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENTS

The issue before the Court in Diamond v. Chakrabartywas whether a living
organism-in this case a genetically engineered petroleum-consuming bacterium--constitutes patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent
Act. 12 4 The ChakrabartyCourt voted five to four to overrule the initial decision
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals, which had
held "that § 101 was not intended to cover living things such as ...laboratory
created micro-organisms."1 25 A majority consisting of Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens held that patentable subject
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (1980)
IP area
Patent
Scores

Justices

Court
Judicial
Law Rev.
Pro-IP
Liberal
division
citations
citations
Yes
No
5/4
117
1218
Court
Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.15
-0.27
-0.27
1.10
0.48
Marshall,Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, White, Stewart, Powell, Burger,
Rehnquist

123. This second step is admittedly subjective; however, the complete analysis of all twenty-two
cases is available in an on-line appendix to this Article. See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the
Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases: On-Line Supplement (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.matthewsag.net/files/A%20Doctrinal%20Review%20of%2022%20Leading%
20IP%20Cases.pdf.
124. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
125. Id. at 306.
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matter should be broadly construed, extending to "anything under the sun that is
made by man."12 6 The majority held that the patent owner's micro-organism
the meaning of
constituted a "manufacture" or a "composition of matter" within
' 127
the statute and thus "qualifie[d] as patentable subject matter."
The significance of Chakrabartycan hardly be overstated: the Court's decision to expand the scope of patentable subject matter to include genetically
engineered bacteria, and living organisms more generally, "jump-started the
fledgling biotechnology industry" in the United States. 128 Moreover, Chakrabarly
laid the foundation for an expansion of patentable subject matter in a multitude
of areas including computer software and business methods.1 2 9 Chakrabartyis
an unambiguously pro-IP decision in that it created a far more favorable
environment for patent owners generally, in addition to being a significant
victory for the individual patent owner before the Court. Accordingly, SJS's
coding of this case as expanding IP rights (Pro-IP = 1) is borne out by a
substantive analysis of the decision.
Spaeth codes this case as conservative (Lib = 0), presumably on the basis
that the outcome restricted competition.130 Chakrabarty largely reflects the
ideological composition of the Court at the time: the majority is conservative,
with the exception of Justices Blackmun and Stevens who were each only
mildly liberal at that time, and the minority is liberal, with the exception of
Justice Powell.13 The Ideological score of 0.15 appears to understate the
strength of the decision. The score generated by the Collegial measure, -0.27,
appears puzzling in view of a substantive review of the decision. On this metric,
Chakrabarty would be a neutral or slightly liberal decision-an assessment
which is simply unsustainable in light of the outcome of the case, the sweeping
language invoked by the majority, and the long-term effect of the decision. The
Strategic-Mean score of 1.10 comes closest to capturing Chakrabarty's strong

126. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
127. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. In contrast to the majority's expansive reading of the statute, the
dissent-Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell-argued that
the Court's decision does not follow the unavoidable implications of the statute. Rather, it
extends the patent system to cover living material even though Congress plainly has legislated
in the belief that § 101 does not encompass living organisms. It is the role of Congress, not
this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws. This is especially true where, as
here, the composition sought to be patented uniquely implicates matters of public concern.
Id. at 321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and ProprietaryRights: Putting Patents in Their
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REv. 217, 235 (2006); see also John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology
Policy, and Patentability:Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101,

125 (2001) (arguing that Chakrabartyset the stage "for a decade of aggressive expansion of biotechnology patenting").
129. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
130. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Patent" under the general issue of
"Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
131. These assessments are based on the Martin-Quinn Scores. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 7.
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132
pro-property and implicitly conservative orientation.
The seminal Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. case
addresses two distinct issues: first, the application of the Copyright Act to
private acts of copying; and second, the potential scope of liability for manufacturers of copying equipment capable of both lawful and unlawful uses. 1 33 Sony
manufactured and sold video cassette recorders (the Sony Betamax) to the
public. As the video cassette recorder became more popular, it became more
common for members of the public to record broadcast television programming
for later use. 134 A group of copyright owners who objected to this practice
sought to hold Sony liable under the Copyright Act for the alleged acts of
135
infringement by Betamax users.

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
IP area
Copyright
Scores

Justices

Court
Judicial
Law Rev.
Pro-IP Liberal
division
citations
citations
No
Yes
5/4
577
2226
Court Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.74
1.54
1.54
0.08
0.74
Marshall,Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, White, Powell, Burger,
O'Connor, Rehnquist

Balancing the interests of copyright owners against the interests of legitimate
manufacturers and non-infringing members of the public, the majority of the
Supreme Court held that the sale of "copying equipment ... does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product ... is capable of substantial non'
infringing uses." 136
The majority further held that the Sony Betamax was
capable of a substantial non-infringing use because private, non-commercial
time shifting constituted a fair use. 13 7 The majority's finding of fair use rested
primarily on the non-commercial nature of time shifting and on the failure of
the copyright owners to demonstrate any meaningful
likelihood of harm to the
138
potential market for their copyrighted works.
Sony is arguably the Supreme Court's most significant copyright decision of
the last fifty-five years. It creates an important safe harbor for technology

132. The Strategic-Median measure lies between the two already discussed, yielding a score of 0.48.
133. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,420 (1984).
134. Id. at 422-23.
135. Id. at 420.

136. Id. at 442.
137. Id. at 442-47.
138. Id. at 448-49, 450-51,454-55.
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developers by protecting them from claims of copyright infringement based on
the mere fact that, in the hands of the public, their products are capable of
infringing the rights of copyright owners. 139 Sony is also a significant benchmark in developing a broad view of the application of fair use to private
non-commercial conduct.' 4 ° This has become particularly significant in light of
the personal computer and Internet revolutions, which have
drastically in41
creased the significance of private non-commercial copying.1
The Sony Court's simultaneous limitation of the universe of activity that
might constitute copyright infringement and of the potential indirect liability of
technology developers for downstream acts of infringement meant that Sony
clearly reduced the legal rights of copyright owners compared to the status quo
of the Court of Appeals decision.' 4 2 The SJS coding of this case as limiting IP
rights (Pro-IP = 0) is entirely congruent with this substantive account of the
decision.
Spaeth codes Sony as liberal (Lib = 1), presumably because the case outcome
favored competition.14 3 In contrast, the Ideological score for Sony, 0.74, indicates that this is a mildly conservative decision. Interestingly, in spite of the fact
that Sony resulted in a 5-4 split among the Justices, the "disordered" nature of
this division resulted in a Strategic-Median score that was the same as the
Ideological score.'" If IP is the most salient issue in the case, this moderately
conservative Strategic-Median score is difficult to reconcile with the fact that
the majority ruling both enlarged the scope of fair use and shrank the scope of
indirect liability for copyright infringement. 145 The score suggested by the
Collegial measure, 1.54, implies that Sony was a very conservative case. Thus,
the Collegial measure is even more difficult to reconcile with a substantive
examination of the Sony decision, for the same reasons.

139. The question of exactly what constitutes a substantial non-infringing use has been litigated in a
number of circuits, but the Supreme Court has declined to further expand upon the meaning of the
concept. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005). The
Supreme Court's decision in Grokster is reviewed below. See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying
text.
140. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 1850 (arguing that without the Sony safe harbor, a host of
technologies that facilitate private or personal use copying might have never become widely available).
But see Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox,55 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 917, 951-52 (2005) (arguing that
Sony did little to effectively shield subsequent technologies).
141. See GoLDsTEN, supra note 79, at 106.
142. The irony of the Sony decision is that in rejecting the copyright owners' claims, the decision
served these same owners' long-term interests by facilitating the growth of the video rental market. See,
e.g., Matthew Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal
Efficiency, 81 TuL. L. REv. 187, 240-41 (2006).
143. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Copyright" under the general
issue of "Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
144. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Measuring Deviationsfrom Expected Voting Patternson Collegial
Courts, 5 J. EPmpnucAL LEGAL STU. 819, 833-36 & tbl.3 (2008) (citing Sony as one of the many
examples of disordered voting-that is, cases in which the Justices' votes bear little or no resemblance
to the standard unidimensional ideological spectrum).
145. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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The Strategic-Mean score, 0.08, is the most intuitively plausible of the three
Jacobi measures in this case. A case outcome score of 0.08 suggests that the
decision is essentially neutral. That is, it does not really alter the rights of IP
owners in any significant fashion, and it is not especially liberal or conservative.
While this is not the predominant view of the Sony decision within the IP
academy, 146 it is not an unreasonable position given the majority's explicit
attempt to balance the interests of copyright owners, legitimate manufacturers,
and the general public. 147 The neutral case outcome score suggested by the
Strategic-Mean measure also comports with the disordered nature of the voting
in this case.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
IP area
Copyright
Scores

Justices

Court
Judicial
Law Review
Pro-IP Liberal
division
citations
citations
Yes
No
6/3
714
1707
Court Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.66
-0.49
-0.49
1.13
1.04
Marshall,Brennan, Stevens, Blackmun, Powell, White, O'Connor,
Burger, Rehnquist

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprisesto determine whether the unauthorized quotation of a public
figure's forthcoming manuscript in a news magazine amounted to fair use under
the Copyright Act. 148 In 1979, President Gerald Ford's Memoir, A Time To
Heal, was contracted for publication by Harper & Row, who had in turn agreed
to provide Time magazine with the exclusive rights to print prepublication
excerpts of the memoir. 149 Naturally enough, Time's primary interest related to
those aspects of the manuscript pertaining to President Nixon's resignation and
Ford's decision to pardon Nixon for any offenses he may have committed in
relation to the Watergate conspiracy. 15 0 However, Time's exclusive was preempted when The Nation, a magazine devoted in large part to political commentary and news, obtained a copy of the Ford manuscript and published its own
2250-word article concerning the Nixon pardon. 1 5' The Nation's article relied
on a number of direct quotes from the original manuscript, amounting to about
146. See Litman, supra note 140, at 918 & nn.3 & 6 (discussing the various views on the effect of
Sony).
147. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55.

148. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 541-42 (1985).
149. Id. at 542.
150. Id. at 542-43.

151. Id. at 543.
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300 words in total.15 2 The appearance
of The Nation's article caused Time to
53
cancel its planned publication. 1
The majority of the Supreme Court held that in light of The Nation's intended
commercial purpose and the fact that it supplanted the copyright owner's right
to control first publication, the defendant's magazine article was not a fair use of
the manuscript. 154 The majority discounted the brevity of the quotations copied
by The Nation in light of their central importance in the memoir and the adverse
impact of the article on the contract with Time. 15 5 In addition, the majority held
that there was no basis in the First Amendment for a rule giving the fair use
doctrine broader scope in cases involving a public figure's manuscript, rejecting
the dissent's argument that the purpose of the use-relating a historical event of
undoubted significance in a non-fictional biography-strongly favored the fair
1 56
use defense.
It is difficult to evaluate the long-term significance of Harper & Row. The
Court's holding strikes many commentators as idiosyncratic.15 7 This case is still
frequently cited for the proposition that the fourth fair use factor, the effect on
the market, is the most important one. 158 And yet this aspect of the decision
appears to have been disavowed by the more recent Supreme Court case of
Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc.159 The Supreme Court's emphasis on the
unpublished nature of the work inspired a series of rather extreme decisions in
the same vein in the Second Circuit, leading Congress to amend section 107 by
way of correction. 160
The SJS coding of Harper & Row as expanding, rather than contracting, IP
rights (Pro-IP = 1) is clearly consistent with the substance of the majority
decision. The majority in Harper & Row takes an extremely broad view of the
prerogatives of the copyright owner, imposes the loosest imaginable threshold
for substantial similarity, and narrows significantly the application of the fair
use doctrine.16 1 Spaeth codes this case as conservative in orientation (Lib =
0),162 which is also consistent with this analysis.
The outcome scores for the Ideological measure, 0.66, the Strategic-Median

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 544-45.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 564-69.

156. Id. at 555-60; id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. See, e.g., 4 MELVnILE B. NmtasiR & DAVID NmIam, NAn~MER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][5], at
13.202.2 (2008) (arguing that Harper & Row "demonstrates the almost infinite elasticity of each of the
four factors [of the fair use doctrine], and their concomitant inability to resolve difficult questions").
158. See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003).
159. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994).
160. See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New StructuralAnalysis of Copyright's Fair Use
Doctrine, 11 MIcH. ThLEcoMM. & TECH. L. REv. 381, 389-90 (2005).
161. Robin Feingold, Note, When "Fairis Foul": A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REa.218, 234 (1986).
162. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Copyright" under the general
issue of "Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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measure, 1.04, and the Strategic-Mean measure, 1.13, each depict Harper &
Row as either a moderately conservative decision or a solidly conservative
decision. In contrast, the Collegial score for Harper & Row is -0.49, which,
contrary to the analysis above, implies that the majority's decision was actually
moderately liberal. It is very hard to conceive of Harper & Row as a liberal
decision applying any of the Spaeth underdog characterizations or in terms of
its IP implications. The incongruity of the Collegial score is only tempered by
its small value. The two Strategic scores are the most persuasive summary of
the case.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
IP area
Copyright
Scores

Justices

Court
Judicial
Law Review
Pro-lIP Liberal
division
citations
citations
Yes
Yes
9/0
752
546
Court Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
1.01
2.59
-4.32
0.16
1.01
Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, White, Kennedy, O'Connor,
Scalia, Rehnquist

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid to resolve a circuit split -as to the correct interpretation of the
"work for hire" provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.163 The specific
question was whether, under the statutory reformulation of the "work for hire"
rule, copyright in a commissioned piece of sculpture belonged to the artist or
the non-profit organization that hired him.164 In 1985, the Community for
Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a non-profit organization dedicated to eliminating homelessness, entered into an oral agreement with Reid, a sculptor, to
produce a statue dramatizing the plight of the homeless. 165 Upon completion of
the sculpture, Reid claimed to own the copyright in the sculpture by virtue of
his authorship, and CCNV
claimed copyright ownership by virtue of section
166
101 of the Copyright Act.
Interpreting the statutory language, "a work prepared by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment," 167 the Supreme Court held that the term
"employee" carries its common law meaning. 168 In doing so, the Court rejected

163. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 732 (1989).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 733.

166. Id. at 735-36.
167. Id. at 838 (citing Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
168. Id. at 740.
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the argument that work for hire status should be resolved in reference to the
hiring party's right to control or actual control of the contracting party.169
Applying the common law meaning of employee, the Court held that Reid was
not an employee, but an independent contractor, given that he was hired only
for one specific task for a limited 17time,
worked in his studio with his own
0
materials, and was a skilled sculptor.
CCNV is one of only two cases in the IP dataset that required the Court to
choose between conflicting claims of IP protection-in this case, the conflict
was between the sculptor's claim of copyright ownership based on authorship
and CCNV's claim of copyright ownership based on the "work for hire"
doctrine. 71 SJS coded the artist in CCNV as the IP owner because he was the
original author of the work in question, which makes the case a decision in
favor of IPrights (Pro-IP = 1).
The Ideological score of the CCAV case was 1.01, a score which is consistent
with the SJS Pro-IP coding, although it is inconsistent with Spaeth's coding of
the case as a liberal decision (Lib = 1).172 However, a substantive review of this
case illustrates that Pro-IP might be a more reliable indicator of a conservative
decision here than the traditional Spaeth coding. Spaeth presumably codes
CCNV as a liberal decision because it is "anti-employer" "in the context of
issues pertaining to... economic activity."' 1 73 We take no issue with the Spaeth
coding as a general guideline; however, it is erroneous to conclude that CCNV is
a liberal decision because it favors the employee over the employer, given that
the Court ruled that Reid was in fact not an employee at all. 17 4 The decision
does not, in fact, favor employees over employers; it favors traditional common
law independent contractors and places them in a privileged position vis-A-vis
regular employees. The Strategic-Mean score of 0.16 also indicates that CCNV
is a conservative decision, but one that is very close to neutral. Given the nature
of the case-resolving a circuit split on a narrow question of statutory interpretation-there would appear to be ample justification for regarding this as a fairly
neutral decision.
The conflict between the Spaeth coding and the Pro-IP coding in this case
offers two contending case outcome scores under the Collegial measure. If
Spaeth is correct that CCNV is a liberal decision, then the Collegial measure
dictates a score equal to the ideological score of the most conservative Justice to
sign on to the decision: in this case, Justice Rehnquist, with an ideology score of
2.59.175 On the other hand, if Pro-IP is a better indicator, then the alternative

169. Id. at 742.
170. Id. at 751-52.
171. Id. at 735. The other case is New York imes Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
172. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Copyright" under the general
issue of "Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
173. Spaeth, Spaeth Codebook, supra note 19, at 54.
174. Cmity.for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 752.
175. Martin & Quinn, supra note 7.
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Collegial measure dictates the case outcome score equal to the ideology of the
Justice most skeptical of IP: in this case, Justice Marshall with an ideology
score of -4.32.176 Although our doctrinal analysis of the case presented above
suggests that CCNV is indeed conservative, the degree of conservatism suggested by a score of 2.59 is difficult to reconcile with the substance of the
decision. On the other hand, the alternative Collegial score of -4.32 places
CCNV at the extreme end of an anti-IP-pro-IP continuum, which is even harder
to reconcile with the facts.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992)
IP area
Trademark
Scores

Justices

Liberal
No
Collegial

Court
division
9/0
Collegial

Median (Liberal)

(Pro-IP)

Pro-IP
Yes
Court

Judicial
Law Review
citations
citations
1075
626
Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median

0.56
-2.08
-2.08
0.63
0.56
Stevens, Blackmun, White, O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,Inc.
to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to the scope of trade dress protection
in the absence of a federal registration. 177 The specific question in Two Pesos
was whether the trade dress of a restaurant could be protected under the unfair
competition provision of the Trademark Act based on a finding that the appearance of the restaurant was inherently distinctive, but without any proof that the
general public had actually come to associate that unique appearance with the
plaintiff (that is, without proof that the trade dress had "secondary meaning"). 178
Taco Cabana was a restaurant chain originating in San Antonio, Texas that
had adopted a Mexican theme as its trade dress, consisting of a festive eating
atmosphere with a combination of interior dining and patio areas decorated with
artifacts, bright colors, paintings, and murals.1 79 Taco Cabana accused Two
Pesos of copying its restaurant theme and thus engaging in unfair competition. 18° The district court and the court of appeals each held for Taco Cabana
based on the jury's finding that that Taco Cabana's trade dress was inherently

176. Id.
177. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992). "The 'trade dress' of a product
is essentially its total image and overall appearance." Id. at 765 n. 1.
178. Id. at 766 & n.4.
179. Id. at 765.
180. Id. at 765-66.
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distinctive. 18 Based on the jury's conclusion, both courts rejected Two Pesos'
argument that the lack of a secondary meaning precluded a finding of inherent
distinctiveness. 182 The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and held
"that proof of secondary meaning [was] not required to prevail on a claim under
[the Trademark Act] where the trade dress at issue [was] inherently distinctive." 18 3 Specifically, the Court argued that there was no reason to apply a
trade dress because it
general requirement of secondary meaning to unregistered
18 4
trademark.
registered
a
for
required
be
not
would
Two Pesos is significant in trademark jurisprudence for confirming that "the
general principles qualifying a mark for registration under section 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under section 43(a)."' 8 5 However, beyond
this general principle, the significance of Two Pesos is open to question. In
2000, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of trade dress and all but confined
Two Pesos to its own facts. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Justice
Scalia artfully explained that the Court recognizes inherently distinctive trade
dress that is equivalent to product packaging, but that trade dress for product
design or product features can never be inherently distinctive as a matter of
law.' 86 Accordingly, any claim for trade dress protection with respect to a
product feature must be accompanied by proof of secondary meaning.'8 7 Justice
Scalia also observed in Wal-Mart that where the classification between product
design and packaging is uncertain, courts should err on the side of caution and
classify the trade dress as product design.' 88 Thus,189Wal-Mart effectively undermines the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos.
At the time of the decision, however, Two Pesos substantially increased the
scope of trademark protection for businesses that had adopted a distinctive trade
dress, but were nonetheless unable to establish secondary meaning. This substantive reading of the case is consistent with SJS's coding of Two Pesos as
expanding IP rights (Pro-IP = 1). Spaeth codes this case as conservative (Lib =
0), either on the basis that the decision is anti-competition or that the decision
was regarded as pro-"large business" over "small business" in the general issue
of "economic activity."' 90 Although if the latter is the rationale of the Spaeth

181. Id. at 766.

182. Id. at 766-67.
183. Id. at 776.

184. Id. at 770.
185. Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
186. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212-13 (2000).
187. Id. at 216.
188. Id. at 215.
189. However, Justice Scalia reconciles Wal-Mart with Two Pesos by relegating the trade dress in
the latter to the status of "some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the
present case." Id. at 215.
190. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Trademark" under the general
issue of "Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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coding, it directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's own conception of what it
was achieving-the Court was motivated, at least in part, by the concern that a
requirement of secondary meaning "could have anticompetitive effects, creating
particular burdens on the startup of small companies.' 1 91
The Ideological score in this case, 0.56, suggests that Two Pesos is a
moderately conservative decision. The Strategic-Mean score, 0.63, is essentially
no different. In contrast, adopting the Collegial measure in this case yields a
score of -2.08. This large negative value implies that Two Pesos is an extremely liberal decision. The correct ideological classification of a decision such
as Two Pesos will always be subject to debate: the case concerns the competing
interests of two restaurant chains, and there is no obvious reason why one
should be regarded as a liberal underdog or the other a conservative darling.
Although one chain is larger than another, this does not seem to have been
influential in the Court's decision. Accordingly, it is difficult to sustain an
ideological classification of the case based on party status alone. What is clear
about the case is that it is a decision in favor of broader intellectual property
protection and so provides a sounder basis for identifying the decision as
conservative. Therefore the conclusion dictated by the Collegial measure-that
this case is extremely liberal-is difficult to sustain.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushild Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)
IP area
Patent
Scores

Pro-IP

Liberal

Court
division

Judicial
citations

Law Review
citations

Yes

No

9/0

398

353

Collegial
(Pro-IP)

Strategic-Mean

Strategic-Median

-2.71

0.25

Court
Collegial
Median (Liberal)
-0.20

Justices

-2.71

-0.20

Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas

In patent law, the doctrine of equivalents provides that a patent can be found
to be infringed even if the defendant's product falls outside the literal scope of
1 92
the patent claims, so long as its features are "equivalent" to the patent claims.
The Supreme Court confirmed the continued viability of the doctrine of equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. in 1997.193 In
Festo, the Supreme Court returned to the doctrine of equivalents and its
interaction with another important concept in patent law, the rule of "prosecu-

191. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992).
192. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002).
193. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
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tion history estoppel."' 194 Simply put, prosecution history estoppel prevents a
patentee from obtaining the benefits of equivalents to the literal terms of her
patent claim if she is deemed-to have forgone those equivalents by amending
195
the patent application in the course of prosecution through the patent office.
In substance, the doctrine of equivalents expands a patent's scope whereas
prosecution history estoppel confines it.
In Festo, the patentee claimed a magnetic rodless cylinder (a piston-driven
device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system) with two
sealing rings, each with one lip. 196 The accused infringer's device only had one
sealing ring, but this ring featured a two-way lip. The patent owner argued that
this difference was sufficiently immaterial as to fall within the scope of the
patent under the doctrine of equivalents.1 97 The Federal Circuit held against the
patent owner on the basis that, by narrowing its claim during the course of
prosecution, the patentee had surrendered all equivalents to the amended claim
element. 198
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that prosecution history
estoppel should not be reserved solely for amendments intended to avoid the
prior art, but rather could be applied to any narrowing amendment made to
satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act. 199 However, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the decision of the Federal Circuit because of that court's
expansion of the effect of prosecution history estoppel. 20 0 Departing from its
own precedent, the majority of the Federal Circuit had concluded that an
amendment giving rise to estoppel should function as an absolute bar to every
equivalent of the amended claim. 20 1 The Federal Circuit had formed that view
based on its experience that a flexible bar rule was uncertain and unworkable.20 2
The Supreme Court rejected the application of a per se rule in this context,
believing that such an approach was "inconsistent with the purpose of applying
the estoppel in the first place., 20 3 The Supreme Court saw "no reason why a
narrowing amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents [that were]
of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of
unforeseeable at the time
'2 4
what was surrendered. 0
Compared to the status quo of the Federal Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Festo expands the scope of patent protection by limiting the preclusive effect

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
banc).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 735-37.
Id. at 737-38.
Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 574-75.
Id.
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 737-38.
Id. at 738.
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of prosecution history estoppel in certain circumstances.2 0 5 This substantive analysis

is consistent with SJS's coding as expanding IP rights (Pro-IP = 1).
Spaeth codes the Festo decision as conservative (Lib = 0), presumably on the
basis that it is "anti-competition," given that the patent holder and the defendant
were rivals in the same industry. 20 6 In contrast to this assessment, the Ideological score, -0.20, indicates that the substance of the decision is somewhere
between neutral and mildly liberal. Adopting the Collegial measure in Festo
yields a score of -2.71, which indicates that the decision is very strongly
liberal. The Strategic-Mean measure yields a score of 0.25, indicating that the
decision is somewhere between neutral and mildly conservative, consistent with
both SJS and Spaeth. The modest values generated by the Ideological and the
Strategic measures are easily reconcilable with the incremental nature of the
decision. The Collegial measure outcome, which depicts the case as very
strongly liberal, appears to be incongruous.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
IP area
Copyright
Scores

Justices

Court
Judicial
Law Review
Pro-IP
Liberal
division
citations
citations
Yes
No
7/2
64
831
Court Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.22
-1.72
-1.72
0.84
0.82
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas

In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the
constitutionality of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).2 °7 Broadly
speaking, the effect of the CTEA was to expand the duration of copyrights by
twenty years: most commonly, from the life of the author plus fifty years to the
life of the author plus seventy years. 208 The petitioners argued that the CTEA's
extension of the term of protection for existing copyrights exceeded Congress's
power under the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.20 9
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected various challenges to the constitutionality of the CTEA. On the question of rationality, the majority noted that
205. See id.
206. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Patent" under the general issue of
"Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
207. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193-94 (2003).

208. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (providing that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to

their respective Writings").
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Congress had retroactively expanded the term of copyright protection in the past
and that Congress was entitled to substantial deference on the exercise of its
legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. 21 ° The majority agreed
with the government that American authors would benefit from the term extension because the benefits of a longer term provided in some European Union
nations were conditioned on reciprocity. 2 11 The majority also noted that a longer
copyright term might encourage "copyright holders to invest in the restoration
and public distribution of their works. 2 12
Noting that life plus seventy was still a finite period, the majority rejected the
petitioners' argument that the term extension contravened the "limited Times"
restriction of the Copyright Clause.2 13 The majority also disagreed with the
contention that a retroactive extension of copyright duration does nothing to
"promote the Progress of Science" as contemplated by the preambulary language of the Copyright Clause.21 4 The Court declared that Congress, not the
courts, is responsible for deciding how to achieve the Copyright Clause's
that provided the rational basis for the
objectives and that the same justifications 215
legislation also satisfied this requirement.
Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the First Amendment required
copyright legislation to be subject to the same heightened standard of judicial
review as content-neutral regulation of speech.2 16 The majority reasoned that
copyright played an important role in promoting the creation and publication of
free expression and that copyright law contained sufficient built-in First Amendment accommodations, such as the distinction between ideas and their expression, and the fair use doctrine.2 17
The decision of the majority in Eldred allows Congress to expand the scope
of copyright and patent protection with only the most cursory judicial scrutiny.
This deference to Congress and the pro-IP nature of the legislation under
consideration is consistent with the SJS coding of Eldred as expanding IP rights
(Pro-IP = 1). Spaeth categorizes this case as pertaining to copyright, within the
broader rubric of economic activity, and as conservative (Lib = 0), again
presumably on the basis that it is "anti-competition. 2 1 8 Viewed in constitu210. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.
211. Id. at 205-06. The Council of the European Communities had instructed EU members to enact
a similar term extension. Id. at 205; see also Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 290)

11 (EC).
212. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207. But see Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of
Copyrighted Works: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92
MINN. L. REv. 1031 (2008) (finding no evidence that works without owners will suffer from under-

exploitation).
213. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-204.
214. Id. at 210-14.
215. Id. at 212-13.
216. Id. at 218-21.
217. Id. at 219.
218. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Copyright" under the general
issue of "Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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tional terms, Eldred is not a conservative decision within the liberalconservative framework because it favors expansive federal power. However,
the Supreme Court's deference to Congress in this case does not come at the
expense of the power of the states, so the Court's broader interpretation of
federal power may be less salient to conservatives. The fact that the legislation
challenged in Eldred expanded the scope of the IP protection also suggests that
the decision is conservative in orientation.
The Ideological score in this case, 0.22, suggests that Eldred is a neutral to
mildly conservative decision. The Strategic-Mean measure, however, suggests
that the decision is significantly more conservative, with an outcome score of
0.84, which best fits the IP impact of the case, but not the constitutional
element. At the other extreme, the Collegial measure yields a score of -1.72,
indicating that Eldred should be regarded as a strongly liberal decision. We find
this view implausible on IP grounds but not implausible on constitutional
grounds.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
Court
Judicial
Law Review
Pro-IP Liberal
division
citations
citations
Yes
No
9/0*
121
421
Court Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.08
-2.54
-2.54
0.19
0.08
Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
* Note that the concurring opinions split 3/3.
IP area
Copyright
Scores

The Supreme Court returned to the issue of a secondary liability for copyright
infringement in the case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.219 The defendants in Grokster were the makers of peer-to-peer file sharing
software that was used commonly, but not exclusively, to illegally share copyrighted music on the Internet. 220 Rather than suing individual users, a group of
copyright owners elected to sue the software distributors, alleging that the
distributors were liable for copyright infringement because the software was
intended to allow users to infringe copyright and had no legitimate commercial
purpose.2 21

Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
the Supreme Court's opinion in Sony as holding that distribution of a
219. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
220. Id. at 919-20.
221. Id. at 920-21, 939-40.
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commercial product that was capable of substantial non-infringing uses
could not give rise to contributory liability for infringement unless the
distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and
failed to act on that knowledge.2 2 2 Although Grokster set the stage for a
possible revision of the Sony safe harbor,22 3 the case was determined on the
alternative grounds of liability for "induced infringement." The Court concluded that the defendants had distributed their software "with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement," and were therefore
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.2 24 Although the
question of the continuing relevance and appropriate interpretation of the
Sony safe harbor for dual-use technologies was vigorously contested in two
separate concurring opinions, the opinion of the Court as a whole expressly
declined to address that issue.22 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Grokster provides copyright owners
with a new theory of liability upon which to hold technology makers liable
for the infringing acts of end-users. As such, the case merits the SJS coding
as a decision in favor of intellectual property rights (Pro-IP = 1). Spaeth
codes Grokster as a conservative decision (Lib = 0), again presumably on
the basis that it is "anti-competition," but possibly because it holds against
the "economic underdog" or because it is "pro-large business vis-t-vis small
business. '2 2 6
Both the Ideological and Strategic-Mean scores, 0.08 and 0.19, respectively, indicate that Grokster is an essentially neutral decision or, at most,
mildly conservative. We consider these scores plausible, but potentially
understating the conservative impact of the Grokster decision. In contrast,
the Collegial score of -2.54 suggests that Grokster is a very strongly liberal
decision, contrary to the SJS and Spaeth coding and to our doctrinal
assessment here.

222. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also supra notes
133-47 and accompanying text.
223. See Litman, supra note 140, at 919 ("The Court will almost certainly revisit its holding in Sony
in the course of deciding Grokster.").
224. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 918-19.
225. Id. at 933-34; see also id. at 942-49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 949-66 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
226. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Copyright" under the general
issue of "Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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APPENDIX

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)
IP area
Patent
Scores

Justices

Court
Judicial
Law Review
Pro-IP
Liberal
division
citations
citations
No
Yes
8/1
153
87
Court Collegial
Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.45
2.77
2.77
-0.12
-0.49
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas

In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of federal jurisdiction in patent cases in light of the Article III case and
controversy limitation, as provided by the "actual controversy" requirement of
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 2 2 7 The key question in the case was whether a
patent licensee must terminate, or at least breach, its agreement before seeking a
declaration28 that the underlying patent is "invalid, unenforceable, or not in2
fringed."
Genentech and MedImmune had entered into a patent license agreement covering
certain Genentech patents.2 29 When Genentech's patent application relating to "the
coexpression of immunoglobulin chains in recombinant host cells" was subsequently
approved by the patent office, Genentech informed MedImmune that it was obliged
under the agreement to pay royalties in relation to one of its products not previously
covered by the agreement. 230 Fearing the possibility of treble damages for willful
infringement and the termination of the license agreement with respect to other
products, MedImmune paid the royalties demanded by Genentech.23 1 MedImmune
nonetheless filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the newly issued
patent was invalid and unenforceable. 32
The district court dismissed MedImmune's declaratory judgment claims on the
ground that there was no actual controversy, and thus no subject-matter jurisdiction,
because Medlmmune had paid the royalties and was otherwise in compliance with the
licensing agreement.2 33 The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that a patent licensee in
good standing cannot establish an Article lfl case or controversy with regard to the
patent's validity, enforceability, or scope.2 3
In the Supreme Court, the majority held that federal jurisdiction extended to a
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120 (2007).
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (2004)).
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"nonrepudiating licensee" declaratory suit, at least in circumstances where the
patent owner has implicitly or explicitly threatened to enforce the patent upon
nonpayment of royalties and the threat would cause significant harm to the
licensee's business.2 35 The majority did not accept the Federal Circuit's view
that no case or controversy existed, reasoning that given the high stakes
involved and the genuine threat of enforcement, the plaintiff should not be
required to "bet the farm, so to speak, by taking the violative action. 2 36
The MedImmune decision exposes patent owners to declaratory judgment
actions by non-repudiating licensees challenging the validity, enforceability, or
scope of their patent rights.2 37 As such, the decision is clearly hostile to the
interests of patent owners and is appropriately classified in the SJS coding as
limiting IP rights (Pro-IP = 0). Spaeth classifies MedImmune as a liberal
decision (Lib = 1) because it finds in favor of jurisdiction.2 3 8 The Ideological
score in this case is 0.45, counter-intuitively indicating that this was a moderately conservative decision. The Collegial measure yields an outcome score of
2.77. This indicates that the majority's decision is extremely conservative,
which is difficult to reconcile with the underlying facts or reasoning of the
decision. In contrast, both the Strategic-Mean and Strategic-Median measures
yield outcomes in the opposite direction. Although the Strategic-Median score,
-0.49, is slightly clearer than the Strategic-Mean score, -0.12, both outcome
scores indicate that MedImmune is a liberal decision. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's decision to provide for a broader scope of standing. It is
also consistent with the lIP-restricting nature of the decision.
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
IP area
Patent
Scores

Justices

Judicial
Law Review
Court
Pro-1IP
Liberal
division
citations
citations
9/0
124
81
No
Yes
Court Collegial Collegial Strategic-Mean Strategic-Median
Median (Liberal) (Pro-IP)
0.45
4.29
4.29
0.37
0.45
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, Alito, Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas

In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the

235. Id. at 124-25, 129.
236. Id. at 129. Justice Thomas dissented, holding that Medlmmune was essentially seeking a

hypothetical ruling. Id. at 137 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 137 (majority opinion).
238. The Spaeth Database classifies the issue in MedImmune as"Standing to Sue, Legal Enquiry"
under the general issue of "Judicial Power." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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issue of "obviousness" in patent law, which determines the extent to which a
new invention must differ from existing inventions in the relevant field in order
to qualify for patent protection. 239 Teleflex and KSR were competitors in the
auto parts field, and both companies supplied pedal assemblies. 24 0 When KSR
added a modular sensor to its existing automobile accelerator pedal system to
make the system compatible with newer vehicles using computer-controlled
throttles, Teleflex alleged infringement of its "Adjustable Pedal Assembly With
Electronic Throttle Control" patent. 241
KSR maintained that the disputed patent claim was invalid because it was
obvious under section 103 of the Patent Act. Section 103 limits patentable
inventions to those that, taken as a whole, would not have been obvious to the
person with ordinary skill in the art in light of the prior art.242 The district court
agreed with KSR on a motion for summary judgment. 4 3 However, the Federal
Circuit reversed, applying its "teaching-suggestion-motivation" (TSM) test. 2 "
Under the TSM test, a patent claim that combines two known elements can only
be deemed to be obvious "if 'some motivation or suggestion to combine the
prior art teachings' can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or
24 5
the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.',
The Supreme Court agreed with KSR that the TSM test as applied by the
Federal Circuit was erroneous.2 46 The Supreme Court rejected the rigidity of the
TSM test as inconsistent with the Court's precedents.24 7 Essentially, the Supreme Court credited the person with ordinary skill in the art with considerably
more resourcefulness than did the Federal Circuit. In particular, the Court noted
that the Federal Circuit erred by limiting the application of any given piece of
prior art to the particular problem the invention was intended to address.24 8 The
Federal Circuit also erred in assuming that a "person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to
solve the same problem." 24 9 The Supreme Court argued that where design needs
or market forces create pressure to solve a particular problem, the person with
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue known options within his or her

239. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2007). The Court had previously
addressed the non-obviousness standard in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Id. at 406.
240. Id. at 409-10.
241. Id. at 405-06. Teleflex was the exclusive licensee of U.S. Patent No. 6,237,565. "Claim 4 of the
... patent describes a mechanism for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile
pedal so the pedal's position can be transmitted to a computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle's

engine." Id. at 406.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 286 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted).
Id. at415.
Id. at 415-18.
Id. at 420.
Id.
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technical grasp.2 50 Accordingly, such refinements are the product of common
sense, not patentable innovation.25 1
The Court was persuaded that given the obvious benefits, mounting an
electronic sensor on a fixed pivot point of the pedal system was a small design
step that was well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant
field.2 52 The Court noted that the marketplace had "created a strong incentive to
convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals" and that the prior art taught a
number of methods for doing just that.2 53 Accordingly, the Court unanimously
held that the patent claim was invalid as obvious.254
The Supreme Court's decision in KSR effectively requires a more substantial
difference between a new invention and the prior art in order to justify the grant
255
of the patent.255 Apart from
its effects on subsequent litigation, 22566 anecdotal
reports suggest that KSR has significantly increased the willingness of patent
examiners to reject applications on the basis that the invention disclosed is
tnieassmn
scnitn
obvious in light of the prior art. 257 This substantive
assessment is
consistent
with the SJS coding of this case as limiting IP rights (Pro-IP = 0). Consistent.
with this, Spaeth classifies KSR as a liberal decision (Lib = 1), presumably
because it is "pro-competition. ' 25 8
In contrast to both SJS and Spaeth, the outcome scores generated by the
Jacobi measures all point to varying degrees of conservatism in this case. The
Ideological score in KSR was 0.45; similarly, the Strategic-Mean score was
0.37. Both of these scores indicate that the decision should be seen as mildly
conservative. Once again, the Collegial measure is more extreme, indicating a
score of 4.29. The moderately conservative case outcome scores generated by
the Ideological and Strategic-Mean measures could be taken to suggest that,
although the decision goes against the interests of intellectual property owners,
it does so only moderately in light of the extremely pro-IP position of the status
quo under the Federal Circuit. The Collegial score, on the other hand, is difficult
to justify.
C. SCORING THE SUPREME COURT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES

Throughout this examination of the Supreme Court's most influential IP

250. Id. at 420-21.
251. Id. at 421.
252. Id. at 422.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 426.
255. Although it must be noted that even small differences from the prior art might be patentable if
they "do no more than yield predictable results." Id. at 416.
256. See, e.g., Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

(invalidating a patent due to obviousness).
257. See Yar R. Chaikovsky & Firasat Ali, Chaikovsky andAli on the Changing Face of Inter Partes
Reexamination, EMERGING IssuEs, Dec. 4, 2007, at 21.
258. The Spaeth Database codes the primary issue in this case as "Patent" under the general issue of
"Economic Activity." Spaeth, Spaeth Database, supra note 19.
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cases, it is clear that the Collegial case outcome scores are at odds with both the
SJS IP case outcome coding and the Spaeth liberal-conservative coding. In
addition, the Collegial scores are often extremely hard to reconcile with a
doctrinal understanding of the impact of each case. It is also apparent that while
the Ideological score generally provides a plausible characterization of each
case, the Strategic scores typically more closely reflect the substance of the
decision. While this undertaking has necessarily involved subjective assessments of the cases, these patterns are sufficiently distinct to provide support for
the conclusions reached from our statistical results.
As such, we can now examine what IPcases look like when scored according
to the best empirical measure of case outcomes, the Strategic-Mean measure.
Tables 10 and 11 display the IP Cases, from most liberal to most conservative,
for non-unanimous liberal outcomes and conservative outcomes, respectively.
Based on our empirical and doctrinal assessment, the Strategic-Mean measure is well suited as an aggregate measure of ideology; however, some caution
is required when using the measure for specific comparisons of the IP content of
individual cases. To the extent that there were multiple issues in a case, the
resulting Strategic scores are, at best, a summary of all of those issues. This
explains how Florida Prepaid,for example, ranks as a conservative decision,
even though it is transparently not a pro-IP decision.25 9 Nonetheless, looking at
the array of cases in Tables 10 and 11 suggests that the Strategic-Mean measure
gives us a plausible assessment of the relative scores of IP cases. Take the three
fair use cases as an example: almost any copyright scholar would agree that
Harper & Row is more pro-IP than Campbell, and that both are more pro-IP
than Sony. This is exactly what the scores suggest.2 6 °
VI. IMPLICATIONS

Although doctrinal analysis is detail-oriented and statistical analysis is aggregation-oriented, our two modes of analysis have identified similar patterns in
both our IP Cases and All Cases data. From our doctrinal examination of the ten
most influential IP cases, we concluded that: both the Strategic and Ideological
measures are plausible; the Collegial measure is not plausible; and the Strategic
measures are both reliable case outcome measures. These results were consistent when examining all twenty-two of the Court's most influential IP cases.26 1
The doctrinal results confirmed our empirical findings. Whether looking at IP
cases or all Supreme Court cases, the Ideological measure consistently displayed correlations in the predicted direction, but at a low to moderate level of
substantive significance. It only reached statistical significance for one of the
three tests-as applied to the liberal-conservative variable in the All Cases data.

259. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
260. The Strategic-Mean scores for Harper & Row, Campbell, and Sony are 1.13, 0.43, and 0.07,
respectively.
261. See supra note 123.
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The Collegial measure, in both its permutations, was consistently in the wrong
direction to that predicted, as assessed by either pre-existing score of case
outcomes. Finally, both Strategic measures were consistently correlated with
both pre-existing outcome scores in the directions predicted, with coefficients
that were both substantively significant and highly statistically significant for all
three tests and when applied to both IP cases and all Supreme Court cases. In
addition, the Strategic-Mean measure was the most normal, displaying the least
kurtosis or skewness. These results have implications for intellectual property
jurisprudence, for developing a rigorous approach to empirical study of the
courts, and for the study of the Supreme Court more generally.
In terms of empirical legal studies, this Article constitutes an important step
in the enterprise of developing rigorous empirical tools generally, and case
outcome measures in particular. It is the first study to take soundly theoretically
derived, continuous measures of case outcomes, apply them to a specific area of
the law and to Supreme Court cases generally, and rigorously test the relative
merits of those measures.
In doing so, we have illustrated that empirical legal studies can do better than
utilizing only the simple liberal-conservative dichotomy, or even our own
outcome-based dichotomous categorization of IP case outcomes. We do not
imply that these categorizations are unhelpful, but we do suggest that we can
have much more sophisticated measures of case outcomes. In particular, we
found that there are two closely related measures of case outcomes that scholars
can confidently use in empirical analysis: the mean of the majority coalition and
the median of the majority coalition. The use of these empirical case outcome
measures allows for both an expansion of doctrinal analysis and a tool for
further empirical study.
To summarize, first, we are confident in our conclusion that the Collegial
measure is an inappropriate measure of case outcomes. The Collegial measure
was regularly at odds with our doctrinal examination of the influential IP cases.
It also produced consistently strange results in our empirical analysis: it created
case outcome scores that were significantly at odds with both the traditional
liberal-conservative case categorization and the Pro-IP case categorization.
These results were substantively large and highly significant and in the opposite
direction to prior predictions. For the Collegial measure to be accurate, it would
have to be true that a majority coalition of conservative-oriented Justices would
regularly sign on to very liberal outcomes in order to mollify the most marginal
Justice, and vice versa. Additionally, case outcomes would have to be only
marginally affected by changes in Court personnel in general, or in movements
of the Court median in particular.
Second, the Ideological measure, the measure favored by many political
scientists, has been shown to be somewhat valid-the mean is not biased but the
distribution is skewed-and somewhat reliable-it appears to consistently capture the correct direction of case outcomes but not the magnitude. But it is not
as valid or reliable as either Strategic measure. Both the Strategic-Mean and the
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Strategic-Median measures are less skewed and capture a lot more nuance. Thus
our doctrinal analysis repeatedly found the Ideological measure to be plausible
but the Strategic measures to be more persuasive: the Strategic measures had a
higher correlation with the liberal-conservative variable in both IP and All
Cases, had a higher correlation with the SJS Pro-IP variable in IP cases, and
were closer to a normal distribution.
For these reasons, despite the fact that the Ideological measure was highly
correlated with both versions of the Strategic measure, we conclude that the
Strategic measures are superior. This accords with the sole other empirical study
on this question, which found that the median of the majority coalition is a
better test of majority case outcomes than a median of the Court measure.2 62
This is not to deny the strong influence of the median of the Court, which many
Positive Political Theory studies either assume or show is generally powerful.
The high correlation between the Strategic and Ideological measures indicates
that the Strategic measures account for the influence of the median of the Court,
but capture more of the effect of variation in coalition composition between
cases. It also accords with recent empirical findings that the Court median is
influential, but not automatically all-powerful.2 63
Finally, in terms of choosing between the two versions of the Strategic
measure, the choice is much closer. The two versions of the measure are highly
correlated and both perform well on the external checks-both statistical and
doctrinal-and thus we consider both to be viable measures of case outcomes.
The Strategic-Median is closer to the median of the Court and therefore closer
to the formalization of Jacobi's strategic model. However, the Strategic-Mean is
more normal and in many cases easier to calculate. We prefer the StrategicMean measure for these reasons, but conclude that the Strategic-Median is also
a valid and reliable measure of case outcomes.
These results are highly informative about the underlying puzzle of judicial
behavior that drove the development of Jacobi's initial case outcome measures:
how do Justices weigh their competing desires to achieve their preferred case
outcomes and, at the same time, maintain large majority coalitions? The conclusion that the Collegial measure is unsound does not imply that collegiality does
not matter on the Court or that Justices do not care about the size of their
majority coalitions. Rather, it tells us something of the manner in which
collegiality matters to Justices. Remember that the Strategic measures also took
account of collegiality; therefore, our results suggest that collegiality matters,
but that Justices take account of it in a sophisticated way, as the Strategic model
assumes, rather than in a naive way, as the Collegial model assumes.

262. Westerland, supra note 44, at 32.
263. See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 76, at 98.
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APPENDIX

Table 12. Results for IP Cases
Court
Strategic- StrategicPro-IP Liberal Median Collegial Mean
Median

Title
Mazer v. Stein

1

0

0.58

0.01

0.76

0.82

United States v. E. I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co.

1

0

0.68

0.68

0.96

0.97

Cold Metal Process Co. v.
United Eng'g & Foundry
Co.

1

1

0.68

1.25

U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co.

0

0

0.12

-0.59

Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Prods. Co.

0

0

0.25

-4.31

Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc.

0

1

0.43

Hoffman v. Blaski

1

1

Schnell v. Peter Eckrich &
Sons, Inc.

0

Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top
Replacement Co. (1961)

-0.51
0.73

0.07
0.87

-0.59

-0.17

0.43

-1.77

-1.48

0.43

1.46

-0.98

-0.52

1

0.53

1.94

-0.31

0

1

0.53

1.27

-1.18

-1.09

Pub. Affairs Assocs., Inc.
v. Rickover

0

1

0.41

1.80

-0.83

-0.16

Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood

0

1

-0.73

2.23

-0.85

-0.73

United States v. Loew's,
Inc.

0

1

-0.77

0.21

-1.40

-0.97

United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co.

0

1

-0.77

0.65

-1.14

-0.87

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.

0

1

-0.83

2.46

-0.74

-0.83

Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.

0

1

-0.83

2.46

-0.74

-0.83

Hudson Distribs., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co.

1

0

-0.83

-1.14

-0.87

Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther

0

1

-0.83

-1.14

-0.87

Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top
Replacement Co. (1964)

0

0

-0.83

Brulotte v. Thys Co.

0

1

-0.56

-5.42
0.48

-0.91
0.65
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0.25
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0.53

0.04
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Table 12. Results for IP Cases-Continued
Title

Strategic- StrategicCourt
Median
Pro-IP Liberal Median Collegial Mean

Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp.

0

1

-0.57

Hazeltine Research, Inc. v.
Brenner

0

0

-0.57

United States v. Adams

1

0

-0.31

Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kan. City

0

1

-0.31

Brenner v. Manson

0

1

-0.57

Switzerland Cheese Ass'n,
Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt.,
Inc.

0

0

-0.30

Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co.

0

0

-0.30

United States v. Sealy, Inc.

0

1

- 1.00

Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc.

0

1

Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research

0

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins

-0.73

-0.57

-5.73

-0.73

-0.57

-5.73

-0.76

-0.57

2.14

-0.67

-0.31

0.83

-0.42

-0.57

-5.85

-0.74

-0.30

-5.85

-0.94

-0.65

0.90

-1.45

-1.08

-0.57

0.47

-0.33

-0.09

1

-0.45

0.66

-1.18

-0.91

0

0

-0.45

-0.05

0.15

Anderson' s-Black Rock,
Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co.

0

1

0.08

0.66

-0.88

0.08

Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research

0

1

0.57

2.19

-0.24

0.57

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.
v. Univ. of 11. Found.

0

1

0.57

2.19

-0.24

0.57

United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc.

0

1

0.21

2.44

-0.45

0.21

Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp.

0

1

0.77

0.77

-1.48

Brunette Mach. Works,
Ltd. v. Kockum Indus.,
Inc.

1

0

0.77

Gottschalk v. Benson

0

1

-0.12

2.14

-0.91

-6.30
3.90
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Table 12. Results for IP Cases-Continued
Court
Strategic- StrategicPro-IP Liberal Median Collegial Mean
Median

Title
United States v. Glaxo
Group Ltd.

0

1

1.04

2.26

Goldstein v. California

1

0

1.04

0.19

1.73

1.27

Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc.

0

1

0.60

4.14

0.56

0.57

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.

1

0

0.57

1.23

0.95

Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken

0

1

0.61

4.21

0.56

0.61

Dann v. Johnston

0

1

0.53

4.30

0.53

0.53

Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.

0

1

0.53

4.30

0.51

0.53

Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad.
Co.

1

0

0.49

0.32

1.51

0.63

Parker v. Flook

0

1

0.26

0.44

Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc.

1

0

0.11

Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil-Co.

1

1

0.11

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown

0

1

0.11

Diamond v. Chakrabarty

1

0

0.15

Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co.

1

0

Diamond v. Diehr

1

0

Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc.

0

1

Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Devex Corp.

1

1

Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios,
Inc.

0

1

Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto
Co.

0

Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc.

1

0

-1.43

-3.00

-0.73

-0.82

-0.12

-0.04

0.14

0.33

4.19

0.09

0.11

4.19

0.09

0.11

-0.27

1.10

0.48

0.15

-0.07

1.31

0.79

0.07

-0.26

1.32

0.80

-0.12

3.91

-0.09

0.46

3.82

0.11

0.46

0.74

1.54

0.08

0.74

0.42

3.76

0.15

0.09

0.17

0.80

0.66

-3.83
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Table 12. Results for IP Cases-Continued
Title

Court
Strategic- StrategicMedian
Pro-IP Liberal Median Collegial Mean

Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder

0

0

0.66

-0.49

1.39

1.24

Harper & Row, Publisher,
Inc.. v. Nation Enters.

1

0

0.66

-0.49

1.13

1.04

Dowling v. United States

0

1

0.66

Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co.

0

0

0.66

Dennison Mfg. Co. v.
Panduit Corp.

0

1

0.78

Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States

0

0

0.78

San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Comm.

1

0

0.08

1

0.21

1.53

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc.

3.58

-0.43

-0.35

0.09

0.66

0.51

0.96

-0.47

1.44

1.20

-0.58

1.15

1.17

-3.83
3.38

-1.15

-0.51

Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc.

0

1

1.01

2.59

Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid

1

1

1.01

2.59

-0.16

1.01

Stewart v. Abend

1

1

0.78

1.83

-0.49

0.78

Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc.

0

0.78

2.42

-0.66

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co.

0

1

0.95

2.17

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc.

1

0

0.56

Prof'l Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc.

1

1

0.68

Cardinal Chem. Co. v.
Morton Int'l, Inc.

1

1

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.

0

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.
Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer

1

0.16

1.01

-0.84

0.08

0.95

0.63

0.56

2.85

0.60

0.68

0.68

2.85

0.60

0.68

1

0.79

3.19

0.52

0.79

0

1

0.72

3.19

0.43

0.72

1

0

0.65

1.12

0.67

-2.08

-0.56
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Table 12. Results for IP Cases-Continued
Court
Strategic- StrategicPro-IP Liberal Median Collegial Mean
Median

Title
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co.

1

0

0.64

-2.80

0.51

0.64

Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.

0

0

0.55

-3.02

0.47

0.55

Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co.

0

1

0.67

3.54

0.45

0.67

Quality King Distribs., Inc.
v. L'anza Research Int'l,
Inc.

0

1

0.62

3.56

0.42

0.62

Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc.

0

1

0.62

3.56

0.42

0.62

Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.

0

1

0.72

3.61

0.42

0.72

Dickinson v. Zurko

0

0

0.72

-1.29

0.85

0.74

Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank

0

0

0.72

-0.86

1.67

1.66

Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd.

0

0

0.72

-0.86

1.67

1.66

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc.

0

1

0.71

1.20

1.25

Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc.

0

0

0.47

0.55

0.67

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc.

0

1

0.71

3.59

0.37

0.71

N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini

1

1

0.47

3.67

0.69

0.67

J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,
Inc.

1

0

0.30

-1.73

0.91

0.97

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.

1•

0

-2.71

0.25

Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vomado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc.

0

0

0.30

-2.71

0.25

0.30

Eldred v. Ashcroft

1

0

0.22

-1.72

0.84

0.82

-0.20

3.59

-2.79
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Table 12. Results for IP Cases-Continued
Title

Court
Strategic- StrategicMedian
Pro-IP Liberal Median Collegial Mean

Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc.

0

1

0.22

3.88

0.41

0.52

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.

0

1

0.22

3.88

0.21

0.22

KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc.

0

1

0.29

4.10

0.37

0.29

Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd.

0

1

0.08

4.10

0.19

0.08

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.

1

0

0.08

-2.54

0.19

0.08

Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc.

0

0

-0.03

-1.55

0.55

I11. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc.

1

0

-0.03

-2.48

eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.

0

1

Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc.

1

0

MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc.

0

1

0.45

2.77

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc.

0

1

0.45

4.29

0.37

0.45

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp.

0

1

4.29

0.63

0.45

0.42

-0.50

-0.49

4.22

-1.45
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-0.03
-0.73

0.37

0.42

1.46

1.45

-0.12

-0.49
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